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Forty Yeas and Five Nays-The Nays
Have It: Morrison's Blurred Political
Accountability and the Defeat of the




Discrediting the testimony of a female victim of physical abuse, a Mary-
land judge exclaimed, "I don't believe that anything like this could happen to
me."'2 Unfortunately, this state judge is not alone in his skeptical attitude
toward female victims of physical abuse and nor are insensitive remarks the
only obstacles females face when bringing gender-based violence cases in
state courts. Until recently, the formal legal systems of several states in-
cluded biased state laws that failed to recognize the status of women as
equals in society.3 To take but one example, seven states allowed a man to
legally rape his wife until 1990.4 The informal impediments that begin with
the reporting of the abuse to police and percolate into the courthouses add to
the formal hurdles women must surmount in state courts.5 Stereotypes about
a woman's role in society, particularly about a woman's willingness to engage
in sexual activity, persist and are reflected in comments like that of the Mary-
land judge.6 In combination, these formal and informal barriers foster a "cli-
mate of condescension, indifference, and hostility" toward female victims of
sexual assault7 thereby creating state judicial systems where the physical
abuse of women is "de jure illegal but de facto permitted. '8
I J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, J.S.M., Stanford Law School, J.D., Indiana Uni-
versity School of Law-Indianapolis, M.S., University of Notre Dame, B.S., Rose-Hulman Insti-
tute of Technology. I would like to thank my J.S.D. adviser, Professor Lawrence Friedman, for
his support during my time at Stanford.
2 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 34 (1991) (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 45 n.50 (observing that Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina re-
tained their marital rape exemptions despite other changes in the law).
4 Id.
5 W.H. Hallock, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Vic-
tins, 68 IND. L. J. 577, 597 (1993).
6 Id. (asserting that stereotypes include blaming the victim and questioning the credibility
of the victim).
7 Women and Violence: Hearing on Legislation to reduce the Growing Problem of Violent
Crime Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 65 (1990) (statement from
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
8 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L. J. 1281,
1303 (1991) (arguing that rape discriminates against women in the same manner that lynching
discriminated against African-Americans during the Reconstruction. Moreover, "[t]he legal sys-
tem is dominated by members of the same group engaged in the aggression. The practice is
formally illegal but seldom found to be against the law").
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Despite the hardships, women must increasingly turn to ineffective state
justice systems to remedy gender-based violence because of the regularity
with which it occurs in our society. Men batter approximately 4,000,000 wo-
men each year and about 95% of all domestic violence victims are female.9
Not only does a man beat a woman every fifteen seconds, but a man also
rapes a woman every six minutes. 10 One in five women can expect to be
raped during her lifetime while one in six will suffer the trauma of domestic
violence.1 ' Recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that "vio-
lence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common
than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined."1 2 In
short, men exact an enormous physical toll on women.
While the sheer number of cuts and bruises women suffer is devastating,
these physical wounds translate into psychological damage for victims and
non-victims alike that ultimately harms our nation's economy. Following an
incident of gender-based violence, women experience "a sense of helpless-
ness.., which may lower self-esteem and hamper trusting relationships....
Anxiety, feelings of vulnerability, and depression may be persistent
problems.' 1 3 Although individual women suffer these "crimes of terror" at
the hands of men, "[t]hey instill fear not only in the actual survivors but in
every woman in America.' 4 In response to this pervasive fear, women
change behaviors such as taking safety precautions in public or staying away
from public spaces altogether. 5 Moreover, the injuries that result from vio-
lence stress the health-care system and cause women to absent themselves
from their jobs during recovery.' 6 Estimates suggest that absenteeism caused
by domestic violence costs employers $3-$5 billion annually.' 7 Overall, the
economic cost of gender-based violence is estimated to be at least $10 billion
9 H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
10 See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 189, 238 (1991) (citing 1989 FBI data and the President of
the National Federation of Business and Professional WomanIUSA Inc.) [hereinafter Violence
Against Women: Victims of the System].
11 See Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Legis-
lation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime Against Women, 101st Cong. 77, 141
(1990) (referring to a 1990 criminological study).
12 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
13 WILLIAM M. GREEN, M.D., RAPE: THE EVIDENTIAL EXAMINATION AND MANAGE-
MENT OF THE ADULT FEMALE VICrIM 69 (1988) (describing the lingering psychological damage
caused by rape).
14 Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Biden maintaining that crimes involving gender-based violence "instill fear not only in the actual
survivors but in every woman in America"); see also Kristin L. Taylor, Treating Male Violence
Against Women As a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575, 596 (1996) (arguing that violence against
women subordinates all women).
15 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (arguing that crimes of violence prevent
potential victims from traveling interstate and from participating in interstate business); George
P. Choundas, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal Protection, the Legal
Invisibility of Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L. J. 1069, 1088-1091 (1995) (reciting that the
fear of violence inhibits women's movement and "suffocates" women's lives).
16 S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53 (1991); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
17 Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, supra note 10, at 240.
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per year, which has a significant impact on interstate commerce. 18 Thus, gen-
der-based violence is a national tragedy that manifests itself both in blood
and money.
Recognizing the states' failure to handle the malignancy of gender-based
violence and the resulting economic costs to the nation, Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994 to augment impotent state
measures already in place. 19 In passing the VAWA as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,20 Congress declared vio-
lence against women, indeed all gender-based violence, to be gender discrim-
ination.2' To fight gender discrimination, the VAWA provides funding to
states so that they may implement programs designed to reduce gender-
based violence.22 Furthermore, the VAWA stiffens criminal penalties for
gender-motivated crimes and criminalizes acts of interstate domestic vio-
lence.23 In addition to the previous funding and criminal provisions, the
VAWA created a private civil rights remedy for acts of gender-motivated vio-
lence in section 13981. The civil rights remedy makes a person (public or
private) found liable for an act of gender-motivated violence in federal court
liable for compensatory, punitive, injunctive, or declarative relief.24 While
litigants challenged other portions of the VAWA in court, the civil rights rem-
edy became far more controversial because it threatened to punish private
actors in federal courts.25
Although Congress asserted power under the Commerce Clause and
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the VAWA's civil rights
remedy, opposition arose to the VAWA based upon the notion of federal-
ism.26 Federalism generally refers to "the division of political power by sub-
ject matter between the national government and the fifty states."27 The
Constitution delegates various enumerated powers to Congress and those not
given to Congress are retained by the states, a command made explicit by the
18 Id. at 189 (assuming a low estimate of approximately 100,000 rapes per year).
19 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); see also S. REP. No. 103-
138, at 38, 49-50 (1993) (discussing failure of states to give credibility to victims of gender-based
crime and lenient punishment of those convicted of such crimes).
20 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796.
21 Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WomEN's L.J. 1, 5 (1996) (calling the declara-
tion "unprecedented").
22 See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
24 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting challenge to
restraining order based upon the Fifth and Tenth Amendments); United States v. Page, 167 F.3d
325, 326 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (equally divided court) (affirming conviction for interstate
domestic violence); United States v. Cunningham, 161 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1998) (denying Com-
merce Clause challenge to domestic violence restraining order provision).
26 See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375
(N.D. Iowa 1997).
27 William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift
in the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DuKE LJ. 769, 770 (1987).
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Tenth Amendment.2 8 By enacting the Tenth Amendment, the Framers as-
sented to Madison's notion of a federal government with few and defined
powers while state power remained numerous and indefinite.29 As a further
safeguard against an all-powerful central government, the separation of pow-
ers between co-equal branches of government serves to check the usurpation
of power by one branch as against the others.30 The federal judiciary, for
example, ensures that Congress remains "within the limits assigned to [its]
authority" when enacting legislation.31 Thus, the federal judiciary protects
against federal legislation that infringes upon states' rights.
The Supreme Court weighed the VAWA's federalism balance in United
States v. Morrison.32 As an indication of support for the VAWA, thirty-six
popularly elected state attorneys general supported the constitutionality of
the civil rights remedy.33 Broad-based support notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court struck down the provision as unconstitutional in a 5-4 decision.34 Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress upset the balance of federalism when it en-
acted the VAWA provision by legislating in areas of traditional state concern
such as family and criminal law.35 As a result, states' rights is the ultimate
trump card by which five votes defeated "forty votes": the support of thirty-
six state attorneys general and four dissenting Justices.
This paper analyzes the assertion of states' rights that defeated the civil
rights remedy of the VAWA. Part II briefly describes the history of federal-
ism, with an emphasis on states' rights theory as revealed in Commerce
Clause cases before and after President Roosevelt's New Deal. Part III
traces the evolution of the controversy surrounding the VAWA's civil rights
provision, including a description of the Court's reasoning in Morrison. Part
IV discusses the "political accountability" theory used by the Court to strike
down legislation in cases like Morrison, arguing that the Court, not the Con-
gress, blurs the lines of political accountability when it strikes down popularly
supported legislation. Part V asserts that the judicial activism exhibited by
the Court in cases like Morrison is unjustified from a historical standpoint.
The Framers intended the people to be the ultimate interpreters of the Con-
stitution and the invalidation of the VAWA contravenes that intent. Moreo-
ver, the history of state-sponsored discrimination in this nation should give
the Court pause before it sweeps away anti-discrimination legislation. The
paper concludes that finding the civil rights section unconstitutional links
present discriminatory acts to our nation's discriminatory past. Furthermore,
the nullification of the civil rights provision threatens other federal legislative
efforts to redress discrimination, such as federal anti-hate crime legislation.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
29 See Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 773 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (J.
Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1987)).
30 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3-§ 2-5 (2000).
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
32 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
33 Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 34-36 (1993) [hereinafter Crimes
of Violence Motivated by Gender].
34 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600.
35 See infra notes 187-189, 219-225 and accompanying text.
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Despite these circumstances, the appropriate recognition of gender-based vi-
olence will occur in time because the law must adapt if the concept of law is
to have real meaning in the everyday lives of the citizens of this nation.
II. The History of Tension Between Federal and State Authority
The latest skirmish between federal and state regulatory authority in
Morrison highlights the tension between the two that has been a permanent
fixture in American legal history. Since ratification of the Constitution, the
regulation of commerce within the nation has been addressed repeatedly by
legislatures.36 Indeed, the intractable problem of trade between the states
during the Articles of Confederation provided one of the instrumental rea-
sons for calling the Constitutional Convention.37 Responding to concern
about commerce among the states, convention delegates endowed Congress
with the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states. '38 The delegates hoped, in the words of Alexander Hamilton,
that the commerce power would end the trade disputes, which "if not re-
strained by national control," would be "sources of animosity and discord. '39
Given this authority over commerce, Congress has used its power to assert
national authority over a variety of state matters throughout history. Predict-
ably, states frequently balked at the notion of federal intrusion into what they
saw as their own affairs.4n As a result, canvassing Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence symbolizes the ebb and flow of the tension between national versus
state regulatory authority.
In the early years of the Supreme Court, the Court regularly upheld the
power of Congress at the expense of states in cases like Gibbons v. Ogden
41
and McCulloch v. Maryland.42 However, the advent of industrialization
brought new challenges to the nation and increased the confrontations be-
tween the Court and Congress over the regulation of commerce.43 In cases
like United States v. E.C. Knight Co., the Court began to define boundaries
for congressional power under the Commerce Clause by holding that local
activity could not be reached by congressional regulation unless it had a "di-
rect" effect on interstate commerce.44 On the other hand, the Court upheld
36 See, e.g., infra notes 41-130 and accompanying text.
37 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 104 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992) (noting
"[t]he interfering and unneighbourly regulations of some states").
38 U.S. CONs-r. art. I, § S.
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 104 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
40 See, e.g., United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (objection by the state of Cali-
fornia to Federal Safety Appliance Act because its operation of railroads involved a "public
function in its sovereign capacity"); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding 1966
amendment to Fair Labor Standards Act against state autonomy challenge).
41 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (invalidating a grant by the New York legislature based
upon the Commerce Clause).
42 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (allowing the creation of the Bank of the United States
based upon commerce authority and also preventing states from taxing the bank).
43 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrruTiONAL LAW 97 (12th ed., 1991) (pointing to the fight
over the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890).
44 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (dismissing an action under the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
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national regulations in cases like Houston East and West Texas Railway Co. v.
United States (The Shreveport Rate Case) by examining the practical impact
of the regulated act on interstate commerce. 45 Thus, the Court ratified na-
tional regulatory power in some cases and nullified it in others. As the 1930s
approached, then, the Court's view of national regulatory power under the
Commerce Clause can best be characterized as ambivalent, yet restrained.
Although the Court treated commerce legislation with ambivalence at
the end of the nineteenth century, the situation changed in 1933 when Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt took office in the midst of the nation's Great Depression.
The Depression wreaked havoc with the nation's economy by decreasing pro-
duction, employment, and income while increasing business failures and
mortgage foreclosures.46 The country required "action, and action now" to
prevent further national economic erosion, and that is exactly what the
Roosevelt administration set out to do.47 Before doing so, however, Con-
gress needed to locate a constitutional source of power for its reforms. Be-
cause the Depression created problems that were economic in nature,
Congress used the Commerce Clause to support its legislative measures.
With a basis for its progressive agenda, the Roosevelt administration em-
barked upon a flurry of legislative activity to stem the tide of the Great De-
pression during the "First Hundred Days" and then awaited the approval of
the courts.
48
Initially, the Court welcomed the reforms and gave the Roosevelt ad-
ministration hope that the Court would uphold subsequent measures.49 The
initial optimism, however, began to fade with the decision in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.50 In Schechter Poultry, a slaughter-
house owner challenged the constitutionality of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act of 1933 (NIRA) after being convicted of wage and trade
violations of a New York competition statute.51 Relying on the power of the
Commerce Clause, the government reasoned that Congress constitutionally
enacted the NIRA because its subject matter regulated items in the stream of
commerce and affected commerce.52 Rejecting these rationales, the Court
held the NIRA to be an unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause, argu-
ing that the transactions did not affect interstate commerce and were not
themselves "in" interstate commerce.53 Despite the nation's economic woes,
the Court announced that "[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or en-
45 Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding author-
ity to regulate intrastate rail rates that discriminated against interstate rail traffic).
46 GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 115.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding mort-
gage law); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding milk regulations)).
50 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
51 Id. at 519 (the defendant allegedly violated the "Code of Fair Competition for the Live
Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area").
52 Id. at 544 (applying the reasoning from The Shreveport Rate Case).
53 Id. at 542-43 (arguing that the interstate nature of the poultry transactions ended when
the shipments reached the local slaughterhouse).
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large constitutional power. '54 Unlike its past ambivalence to national regula-
tion, the Court began to protect the state from what it saw as the ability of
the federal government to trample state authority. Concurring in the opin-
ion, Justice Cardozo summed up the Court's fear of federal encroachment
upon state legislative prerogatives by stating that "activities local in their im-
mediacy do not become interstate and national because of distant
repercussions.
'55
Following these defeats and others,5 6 Roosevelt proposed the now infa-
mous Court-packing plan and despite its failure, Roosevelt claimed that he
had lost the battle but won the war based on subsequent Court decisions.
57
The change in judicial receptivity toward New Deal legislation is reflected in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.5 8 In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board ordered a steel company to end its unfair labor
practices pursuant to its power under the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 (NLRA). 59 Although faced with arguments that the NLRA regulated
purely local activity, the Court upheld the NLRA as a valid exercise of con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause.60 The Court noted that the
text of the NLRA limited its regulatory power to those acts "affecting com-
merce" and that Congress had the power to regulate those acts "which di-
54 Id. at 528 (asserting that Congress only has the authority granted to it by the
Constitution).
55 Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
56 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 283 (1936). In Carter, the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 required coal producers to comply with wage and hour restrictions or
suffer sanctions for failure to do so. Id. at 283-84. To support the Act on Commerce Clause
grounds, the federal government contended that the coal business affected the national interest
and the general welfare of the nation. Id. at 289-91. The Court, however, disagreed and stated
that the notion that the power of Congress extends to issues affecting the whole nation and the
welfare of its people "have always definitely [been] rejected by this Court." Id. at 291. The Act,
according to the Court, would stand or fall based on an analysis of the Commerce Clause using a
direct/indirect test. Id. at 308. In this case, Congress abused its Commerce Clause power by
legislating in areas of "purely local activity." Id. The Court found that the relationship between
employers and employees with the resulting evils did indeed affect interstate commerce, but the
Court characterized those evils as "local evils over which the federal government has no legisla-
tive control." Id. The Court deemed strikes and production problems to be secondary and indi-
rect effects on interstate commerce. Id. In the end, the Court held the Act to be
unconstitutional, thereby dealing another blow to the New Deal. Id. at 310.
57 GUNTnR, supra note 43 at 122-24 (describing the plan as involving the removal of any
judge attaining the age of seventy years of age who has not retired within six months of reaching
that age. If the judge failed to retire, the President could nominate one additional judge to the
court on which the seventy-year-old judge sat. To limit expansion, the plan mandated that no
more than fifteen judges could comprise the Supreme Court); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A His-
TORY oF AMERicAN LAW 685-86 (2d ed., 1985) (stating that "the Supreme Court's veto power
wrecked some of the New Deal's most precious legal engines. Franklin Roosevelt, at this point,
threatened to pack the Court-to increase its size with new appointments, presumably loyal New
Dealers. Despite Roosevelt's great popularity, this plan notoriously backfired." However,
"Roosevelt had the last laugh. He was elected four times, and he simply outlasted the "nine old
men").
58 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
59 Id. at 22 (the violating behavior included the discriminatory discharge of employees
involved with the union).
60 Id at 49 (reversing the decision of the lower court).
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rectly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign commerce. '61 According to
the Court, Congress could use its power to protect interstate commerce "no
matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.' '62 However, the
plenary commerce power did not allow Congress to regulate "effects upon
interstate commerce so indirect and remote" as to "effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.
'63
After Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court continued to allow Congress to
expand its power base vis-A-vis the states in cases like United States v.
Darby.64 In Darby, the Court examined the constitutionality of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 1938.65 Noting that manufacturing itself did not consti-
tute interstate commerce, the Court opined that the shipment of goods
amounted to commerce and fell within Congress's power to regulate.66 Al-
though the regulation of wages and hours typically fell within the province of
the state and some chose not to regulate in this case, "[t]he power of Con-
gress over interstate commerce [can] neither be enlarged or diminished by
the exercise or non-exercise of state power." 67 Brushing state power aside,
Justice Stone declared that the Tenth Amendment stated "but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered. ' 6 According to the Court,
the Tenth Amendment merely sought "to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states
might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. '69 In the end, the
Court found the Act constitutional and continued to shake the floor upon
which state power stood.
While the Court shook the floor of state power with decisions like
Darby, it pulled it out from underneath the states in Wickard v. Filburn.70 In
Wickard, the Court investigated the constitutionality of the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1938, which imposed a penalty on farmers who produced
more wheat than allowed by a given quota.71 Unlike past cases, the Court
61 Id. at 32 (noting that "[it] is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury,
which is the criterion").
62 Id. at 37. The Court observed that the "fundamental principle is that the power to
regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and ad-
vancement.'" Furthermore, the commerce power allowed Congress to legislate to "promote its
growth and insure its safety" and "to foster, protect, control and restrain." Id. at 36-37 (internal
citations omitted).
63 Id. at 37.
64 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
65 Id. at 109-110 (the FLSA regulated the hours and wages of employees engaged in local
manufacturing and prohibited interstate shipment of goods produced by employees falling below
its requirements).
66 Id. at 113 (characterizing the target of the legislation as "indubitably a regulation of the
commerce").
67 Id. at 114 (internal citation omitted). The Court continues: "Congress ... is free to
exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the state for which they are destined it may
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare, even though the state has not
sought to regulate their use." Id. (internal citations omitted).
68 Id. at 124.
69 Id.
70 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
71 Id. at 113.
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refused to refer to "any formula which would give controlling force to no-
menclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of
the actual effects of the activity" on interstate commerce.72 Even though an
activity "be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce," accord-
ing to the Court, "it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irre-
spective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."' 73 Moreover, the Court declared that even
activities that are trivial in isolation could be reached by congressional legis-
lation if the effect on interstate commerce is substantial in the aggregate.74
With its rejection of bright lines and acceptance of the aggregation theory,
Wickard allowed the federal government to venture into state affairs to its
fullest extent.
Despite the reach of Wickard, the Court's sensitivity to state autonomy
began to grow in subsequent decisions like Maryland v. Wirtz75 and Fry v.
United States.76 Following these decisions the Court gave full weight to state
autonomy arguments in National League of Cities v. Usery.77 In National
League of Cities, the Court held an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act unconstitutional because it interfered with integral governmental func-
tions when applied to "States qua States. 78 To a Court majority, upholding
such a law would allow the federal government to impair the states' ability to
regulate in areas traditionally governed by states such as "fire prevention,
police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.
79
Thus, the National League of Cities decision represented the first time in
forty years that the Court invalidated federal legislation based upon the con-
cept of state sovereignty.80
After reaching its height in National League of Cities, the attack on fed-
eral legislation based upon state sovereignty suffered a major defeat nine
years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.8 x In
72 Id. at 120. The Court stated that the commerce power "has been held to have great
latitude." Id.
73 Id. at 125.
74 1d at 127-28 (observing that "appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may
be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial"); see also TRIBE, supra note 30, at § 5-4.
75 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding a 1966 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act
against a federalism challenge). Justice Douglas's dissent urged that the decision constituted
"such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my
belief not consistent with our constitutional federalism." Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upholding the application of the Economic Stabilization Act to the
wages of public employees). The Court noted that the Tenth Amendment was "not without
significance" and declared the "constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal sys-
tem." Id. at 547 n.7.
77 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
78 Id. at 847-52.
79 Id. at 851 (expressing concern about the ability of states to structure employment con-
tracts in these areas).
80 Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Garcia, the Court expressly overruled National League of Cities by holding
that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to a local transit system.82 In so
doing, the Court threw out the concept of state immunity from federal regu-
lation based upon a "judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental
function is 'integral' or 'traditional.' ' '8 3 The Court opined that the states
must be free to act in the manner they choose regardless of how anyone,
including the judiciary, views those acts.84 Moreover, rules using line-draw-
ing tests based upon what one views as "integral" or "traditional" allowed
judges to pick and choose among state policies according to personal prefer-
ences.85 In the end, decision-making based upon bright lines led to inconsis-
tency in the law and "disserve[d] principles of democratic self-government.
'86
Among the principles of self-governance offended by examining the na-
ture of governmental function, according to the Garcia majority, was that of
federalism. Instead of using arbitrary assessments of governmental action to
determine the constitutionality of legislation, the majority opined that the
Court must be guided by the structure of the federal government. 87 In the
minds of the Garcia majority, the Framers designed the federal government
in large part to protect the states from the overreaching of Congress.88 Re-
ferring to Madison, the majority asserted that equal representation in the
Senate adequately protected state sovereignty and that the similarity of inter-
ests between the national and state legislatures provided a buffer against en-
croachment upon state liberty.89 The Framers built "a federal system in
which special restraints on federal power over the states inhered principally
in the working of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limi-
tations on the objects of federal authority."90 The procedural safeguards
within the structure of the federal government, according to the majority,
protected state interests better than judicially created limits or tests.91 Be-
cause states participate in the federal government, "[t]he political process en-
82 Id. at 531 (declaring that "the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immu-
nity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsis-
tent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles
on which National League of Cities purported to rest").
83 Id. at 546-47.
84 Id. at 546 (stating that "[t]he essence of our federal system is that within the realm of
authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or un-
necessary anyone else-including the judiciary-deems state involvement to be").
85 Id. (observing that such tests allow an "unelected federal judiciary to make decisions
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes").
86 Id. at 547.
87 Id. at 550 (asserting that the "principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role
of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself").
88 Id. at 551 (citing JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954)).
89 Id. at 551-52 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison)).
90 Id. at 552.
91 Id. (stating that "[s]tate sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by proce-
dural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limita-
tions on federal power").
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sures that laws that unduly burden the states will not be promulgated,"92 In
Garcia, the Court found that the political process suffered no defect; there-
fore, Congress had the power to regulate the local transit system under the
Commerce Clause.
93
Indicative of the differing views of states' rights issues on the Court, Jus-
tice Powell penned a strong dissent joined by three other Justices in Garcia.
94
According to the dissent, the Constitution guaranteed a "unique" federal sys-
tem of government and the majority opinion significantly tampered with the
system designed by the Framers.95 Although the majority did "some genu-
flecting... to the concept of federalism," their opinion "effectively reduce[d]
the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant
to the Commerce Clause." 96 The dissent argued that the majority's reasoning
allowed "political decisions made by members of the Federal Government"
to determine the ability of states to exercise their sovereignty when Congress
legislated under the Commerce Clause.97 Moreover, the majority's gutting of
the Tenth Amendment implied that these political decisions would be im-
mune from judicial review because they resulted from the political process. 98
For the dissenters, the judiciary constituted the body charged with the obliga-
tion "to say what the lav is"; therefore, the majority decision violated Mar-
bury v. Madison, "the most famous case in [our] history."99
In addition to violating the teaching of Marbury v. Madison, the Garcia
dissent maintained that the majority opinion contravened the basic beliefs of
the Framers themselves. Opponents of the Constitution at the founding
feared that the national government would be too powerful and eventually
devour the political role of the states in the governing process.1°° As a result,
proponents of the Constitution assured doubters that a "provision explicitly
reserving powers in the states" would be a top priority of the new Con-
gress. 01 Protecting states' rights in the Constitution prevented the under-
mining of "the States and the Federal Government, a balance designed to
protect our fundamental liberties."'u 2 Indeed, the dissent opined that the
Framers saw that reserving power for the states served as an effective balance
92 Id at 556 (maintaining that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce
power is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system pro-
vides through state participation in federal governmental action").
93 Id. (stating that "the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as
intended").
94 Id at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor,
J.).
95 Id at 560.
96 Id.
97 Id (noting that these determinations will be made from "time to time").
98 Id.
99 Id. at 567. The dissent previously stated that the majority "rejects almost 200 years of
the understanding of the constitutional status of federalism." Id at 560.
100 Id. at 568.
101 Id (stating that resolving the issue "would be among the first business of the new
Congress").
102 Id at 572.
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to the power of the national government. 103 Interpreting the intent of the
Framers, the dissent maintained that state government regulated the "every-
day concerns of the people" because it responded to them more effec-
tively. 104 By allowing the federal government to regulate intracity mass
transit, a local concern, the dissent urged that the majority eviscerated the
distinction between national and local, and propounded a model of federal-
ism that paid "only lip service to the role of the States."105
If Court observers thought Garcia represented a blank check for con-
gressional invasion of state sovereignty, the Supreme Court cancelled that
check in United States v. Lopez 10 6 by holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990 (GFSZA) unconstitutional. 10 7 After noting that the statute neither
regulated "the use of channels of interstate commerce" nor "instru-
mentalit[ies] of interstate commerce[, or persons] or [ ] thing[s] in interstate
commerce," the Court focused its attention on whether the regulated act sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce. 10
8
The government defended the commercial nature of the legislation by
noting the substantial economic costs of violent crime, a reduction in the in-
clination to travel caused by violent crime, and the threat that guns in schools
posed to the educational process itself.109 The majority, however, reasoned
that the GFSZA failed to regulate an activity constituting "commerce or any
sort of economic enterprise" and found the GFSZA to be a criminal statute
that invaded the police powers of the states. 110 If Congress could enact such
a statute, according to the majority, then Congress could act without "any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law or education
where states historically have been sovereign." ' Agreeing with the govern-
ment's contentions amounted to piling "inference upon inference" that
would convert authority under the Commerce Clause "to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States."112 In the end, the majority refused
to blur further the "distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local" and struck down the GFSZA.
113
Writing a concurrence joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy as-
serted that Lopez forced the Court "to appreciate the significance of federal-
ism in the whole structure of the Constitution."'1 14 The concept of federalism,
103 Id. at 571 (reciting that the states would perform this function based upon the loyalty of
their citizens).
104 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton)).
105 Id. at 574 (stating that the majority failed to account for the state sovereignty intended
by the Framers).
106 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
107 Id. at 568 (affirming court of appeals).
108 Id. at 559.
109 Id. at 563-64 (discussing the government's argument that possession of a firearm in a
school zone may result in violent crime, which will ultimately affect the national economy by
reducing the effectiveness of the educational process).
110 Id. at 561-67.
111 Id. at 564 (stating that if the Court accepted the government's position, it would be
"hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate").
112 Id. at 567.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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according to Justice Kennedy, constituted "the unique contribution of the
framers to political science and political theory."'15 A government based
upon principles of federalism made both the federal and state government
accountable to the citizens. 116 If the federal government began to regulate
areas historically regulated by states, the distinction between what is national
and what is local would be unclear and "political responsibility would be-
come illusory. 11 7 A lack of political accountability posed a greater threat to
liberty than an expansion of power by the national government." 8 Although
the political process ensured the balance of power between the two govern-
ments, the judiciary must intervene when one branch usurped too much
power for itself since the balance of federalism played "too vital a role in
securing freedom." 9 In this case, the Court must intercede because the GF-
SZA tipped the scales of federalism too far in favor of the federal govern-
ment. 20 Moreover, states remained capable to deal with the problem of guns
near schools in a manner commensurate with local opinion, thereby allowing
for varying solutions and experimentation. 121 Because the GFSZA failed to
regulate commerce and regulated an area of traditional state concern, Justice
Kennedy hesitatingly found the statute to be an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.122
Similar to the numbers in Garcia, four of the justices dissented in an
opinion written by Justice Breyer.123 The principal dissent argued that Con-
gress must be given "leeway" when enacting legislation because it, not the
Court, is the body best able to judge the ties between the regulated activity
and interstate commerce. 124 According to Breyer, scrutinizing Commerce
Clause legislation under the "rational basis standard" 25 captures the defer-
115 Id. at 575 (claiming that the insight of the Framers involved the realization that two
governments enhanced liberty).
116 Id. at 576.
117 Id. at 577 (noting that the "boundaries between the spheres of federal and state author-
ity would blur").
118 Id. (based upon the inability to hold either government accountable to citizens).
119 Id. at 578.
120 Id. at 580 (asserting that the "statute before us upsets the federal balance to a degree
that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power, and our intervention is
required").
121 1d at 581 (reasoning that "[i]f a State or municipality determines that harsh criminal
sanctions are necessary and wise to deter students from carrying guns on school premises, the
reserved powers of the States are sufficient to enact those measures").
122 Id. at 583 ("Absent a stronger connection or identification with commercial concerns
that are central to the Commerce Clause, [this] interference contradicts the federal balance the
Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce.").
123 IL at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.).
124 Id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that such a finding "requires the kind
of empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with
accuracy").
125 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,276 (1981) (stating
that when a rationale appears in the legislative record justifying legislative action, the proper
inquiry in assessing that record is whether Congress had a rational basis for its finding); see also
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (stating that "where we find that legislators,
in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regula-
tory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end").
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ence that should be given to Congress when using its commerce authority.1 26
In this case, the facts involving violence, educational harm, and negative eco-
nomic impacts demonstrated that Congress had a rational basis for enacting
the GFSZA.127 Moreover, upholding the GFSZA would neither obliterate
the distinction between national and local nor allow the government to regu-
late just any state matter because the effects of violence on education and the
economics of the nation were well-documented. 2  Although the Court has,
in the past, upheld congressional regulation with fewer ties to interstate com-
merce than those associated with violence in schools, the majority in Lopez
viewed the commerce power in a different manner from that which had been
established for over fifty years. 129 In the end, the dissent reasoned that up-
holding the statute would not expand congressional power but would apply
existing law to new circumstances for the benefit of all citizens.130
III. The VAWA Controversy
With confidence in its commerce authority prior to Lopez, Congress un-
dertook to combat gender-based violence using its commerce power as part
of its basis to enact the VAWA. After receiving evidence regarding the ef-
fects of gender-based violence for four years, Congress created a multidimen-
sional statute embodied in the VAWA to tackle a "national tragedy.' 1 31 For
example, the VAWA disperses $1.6 billion to states to be used to improve
police and educational efforts to reduce gender-based violence. 132 Further-
more, the VAWA requires all states to give "full faith and credit" to protec-
126 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 618-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the connection between guns in school
zones and the economy).
128 Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t must surely be the rare case, then,
that a statute strikes at conduct that (when considered in the abstract) seems so removed from
commerce, but which (practically speaking) has so significant an impact on commerce"); see also
id. at 603-15 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter further discussed the failure of the GFSZA to
intrude into state prerogatives. Id. at 609. The commerce power of Congress, according to Jus-
tice Souter, did not diminish simply because the subject of legislation affected traditional state
concerns. Id. Supreme Court precedent demonstrates the plenary nature of Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause, which allows it to invade state interests if it chooses to do so. Id.
Traditional rules of statutory construction provided the Court with the tools to determine the
existence of such an intent. Id. at 611. By characterizing the GFSZA as a federal criminal
statute, the Court forgot its canons of statutory construction by finding a violation of federalism
principles without finding congressional intent to alter the state-federal balance. Id. By ignoring
these principles, the Court's decision devolved "into the sort of substantive policy review that
the Court found indefensible 60 years ago." Id.
129 Id. at 625-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
130 Id. at 625 (asserting that upholding the GFSZA would recognize that "gun-related vio-
lence near the classroom makes a significant difference to our economic, as well as our social,
well-being").
131 See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39 (1991).
132 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991-13994 (1994) (providing grants for the education and train-
ing of state judges and other monies to be used to study state and federal court practices); 42
U.S.C. § 14031 (1994) (providing grants to states so that they may improve recordkeeping re-
garding stalking or domestic violence).
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tive orders issued in other states and criminalizes interstate domestic
violence.133 Moreover, the VAWA mandates the exclusion of a victim's prior
sexual activity from federal litigation and provides a "rape shield" to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.134 Thus, the VAWA bolsters state efforts to prevent
gender-based attacks and enhances penalties when they occur.
In addition to the funding and criminal provisions, the VAWA created a
civil rights remedy for victims of gender-based violence in section 13981.
Section 13981 allowed for a private action against a "person... who commits
a crime of violence motivated by gender.' 35 However, a person cannot be
held liable under the civil rights remedy for "random acts of violence unre-
lated to gender.' 36 Furthermore, federal jurisdiction is explicitly withheld
from "any state law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony,
equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree.' 1 37 If a
public or private defendant is found liable for a crime of violence motivated
by gender, the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory, punitive, injunctive, de-
claratory, or any other relief deemed appropriate by a court.
138
Litigants began to test the constitutionality of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy in a number of cases because it made private actors liable in federal
courts. In Doe v. Doe,139 the court considered whether a rational basis ex-
isted to find that gender-based violence substantially affected interstate com-
merce, and if so, whether the means chosen to regulate the problem were
reasonably adapted to constitutional ends.140 Answering the first of these
questions, a review of the "statistical, medical, and economic data before the
Congress adequately demonstrated the rational basis for Congress' finding
that gender-based violence has a substantial effect on interstate com-
133 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
134 28 U.S.C. app. § 412 (1994) (changing the Federal Rules of Evidence).
135 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). Subsection (d)(1) defines "crime of violence motivated by
gender" to mean "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." Subsection d(2)(A) defines
"crime of violence" as
an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that
would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of
physical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or
Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, whether or
not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction
and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial,
or prison jurisdiction of the United States.
136 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994) (stating that "[n]othing in this section entitles a person to
a cause of action under subsection (c) of this section for random acts of violence or for acts of
violence unrelated to gender that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence,
to be motivated by gender").
137 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994) (stating that nothing confers "on the courts of the United
States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony,
equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree").
138 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
139 929 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D. Conn. 1996).
140 Id. at 612 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (rational basis/means-ends inquiry)). The plaintiff claimed that she had been subjected to
systematic physical and mental abuse including being forced "to be a 'slave,"' which included
laying out clothes for the defendant's dates with his girlfriends. Id. at 610.
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merce.' 141 The court noted that Congress had actual evidence of a substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce caused by gender-based violence instead
of the "theoretical impact arguments" used to support the statute at issue in
Lopez.142 Analogizing the regulated activity under the VAWA to that in
Wickard, the court opined that "[c]ertainly, the repetitive nationwide impact
of women withholding, withdrawing or limiting their participation in the
workplace or marketplace ... as a result of gender-based violence ... is of
such a nature to be as substantial an impact on interstate commerce as the
effect of excess 'home-grown' wheat harvesting."'143 In sum, the VAWA's leg-
islative findings prevented the court from having to pile "inference upon in-
ference" to find a rational basis to conclude that gender-based violence
substantially affected interstate commerce. 144
In addition to finding a rational basis for the legislation, the Doe court
dismissed the defendant's argument that the civil rights remedy trampled
upon state sovereignty in the areas of criminal, family, and state tort law. 145
The court reasoned that the VAWA left state criminal law intact because
states remained free to criminally punish gender-based violence in the man-
ner they desired. 146 Similarly, the VAWA did not intrude upon state family
law because it denied federal jurisdiction over claims involving divorce, ali-
mony, child custody, or the equitable distribution of property.147 Rather than
displacing any state laws, the Doe court argued that the civil rights provision
complemented tort law by providing a federal forum for the vindication of a
woman's civil right to be free from gender-motivated violence. 148
Turning its attention to the means-ends inquiry, the Doe court observed
that Congress deemed existing state and federal laws inadequate to protect
women from gender-based violence.149 Referring to House and Senate re-
ports, the Doe court observed that "existing bias and discrimination in the
criminal justice system often deprives victims" of redress for the harm suf-
fered and that "[s]tudy after study had concluded that crimes disproportion-
ately affecting women are often treated less seriously than comparable
crimes affecting men." 150 The failure to punish violent crimes against women
continues to harm victims after the fact due to the risk of retaliation if the
initial crime is reported and the lingering emotional damage caused by the
crime.151 Given the demonstrated inadequacy of current legal mechanisms
141 Id. at 615.
142 Id. at 613 (noting the "marked distinction" between the VAWA and the GFSZA).
143 Id. at 614.
144 Id. at 615 (arriving at its conclusion after "careful review of the Congressional history of
VAWA").
145 Id. at 616.
146 Id. (observing that the VAWA did "nothing to a state's authority to arrest and prosecute
an alleged batterer on applicable criminal charges").
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 615 (reiterating that the enactment of the VAWA was based in part on the states'
self-assessment of their failure to protect victims of gender-based violence).
150 Id. at 616 (citing H.R. RaP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 39
(1993)).
151 Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993)).
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and the nature of the conduct to be deterred, the Doe court found the civil
rights remedy to be "reasonably adapted to an end permitted by the Consti-
tution" and upheld the constitutionality of the VAWA's civil rights remedy.152
After the Doe court upheld the constitutionality of the VAWA, other
courts faced similar challenges to the constitutionality of the civil rights pro-
vision of the VAWA, which escalated the debate surrounding the VAWA. 53
In Seaton v. Seaton,154 the court characterized the VAWA's remedy as one of
"extreme overbreadth" and feared that federal courts would become forums
for "domestic disputes and invade the well-established authority of the sover-
eign states.' 1 55 Despite its questions about the wisdom of the VAWA, the
court investigated the constitutionality of the VAWA by using the rational
basis and means-ends inquiries previously employed by the Doe court. 156 Al-
though the VAWA did not regulate commercial activity per se, the Seaton
court observed that Congress had voluminous findings before it that sup-
ported the existence of a rational basis for the legislation. 157 Because Con-
gress concluded that the states failed to protect victims of gender-based
violence with their own judicial systems, the VAWA did not amount to "an
unreasonable means to the ends intended by Congress."'1 58 Thus, the Seaton
court came to the same conclusion as the Doe court and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the VAWA.15
9
Although the Seaton court reached the same conclusion as the Doe
court, it did not do so without hesitation. Commenting on its decision, the
Seaton court opined that it was "quite reluctantly inclined to agree with the
Doe court" in finding that a rational basis to enact the VAWA existed largely
based upon legislative findings.160 Reliance on legislative findings, according
to the court, provided Congress with the opportunity to compile statistics
simply to demonstrate a rational basis for any given piece of legislation.' 6'
While not a concern in this case given the extensive nature of the VAWA
hearings, courts must still closely scrutinize legislative findings to prevent an
end run around the rationality test.162 Nonetheless, the Seaton court contin-
ued to express its "deep concern" that the VAWA allowed federal courts to
152 Id. at 617.
153 See, e.g., Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (upholding the civil rights
remedy as a valid exercise of the Commerce Power, even under Lopez.)
154 971 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
155 Id. at 1190-91. The plaintiff filed suit against her husband under the VAWA claiming
she had been the "victim of conspiracy, fraud, physical and sexual abuse, and emotional suffer-
ing." Id. at 1190. Moving for summary judgment against the plaintiff, the defendant not only
denied the factual assertions, but also argued that Congress exceeded its power under the Com-
merce Clause when it enacted the VAWA. Id. Thus, the Seaton court found itself faced with the
same question as the Doe court faced previously. The court expressed its view that the breadth
of the civil rights remedy would be used by "parties seeking leverage in settlement rather than
true justice." Id.
156 Id. at 1191.
157 Id. at 1192-94 (stating that the VAWA was "clearly not economic on the surface").
158 Id. at 1195 (although stating that it disagreed with "the inclusiveness of the VAWA").
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1193.
161 Id. at 1194.
162 Id. (noting that "it is unlikely Congress would spend four years determining the effects
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hear family law claims.163 The court viewed these claims as more appropriate
for state forums because of their "closer relation to the concerns of their
citizenry" and their ability to apply state law to local areas more capably than
federal courts. 164 In the end, a "clearer signal or cogent framework to handle
this type of legislation" would have helped the Seaton court because of its
trepidation about its result.
165
Courts would receive the needed guidance beginning with Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic and State University,166 a case that would eventually end
up at the doors of the Supreme Court. Like the previous courts, the
Brzonkala district court reasoned that the VAWA would stand or fall based
upon whether the regulated conduct substantially affected interstate com-
merce, the third category of permissible Commerce Clause regulation under
Lopez. 167 Applying the test from Lopez, the Brzonkala court proceeded to
compare the differences and similarities between the statute at issue in Lopez
and the VAWA. 168 According to the court, the differences between the GF-
SZA and the VAWA included the VAWA's voluminous legislative findings,
the VAWA's civil nature when compared to the GFSZA's criminal nature,
and the fewer inferential steps required to find a nexus between the VAWA
and commerce when compared to the GFSZA.169 The court, however, dis-
missed the impact of the legislative findings suggesting that "[w]hile findings
will often be helpful, findings are not necessary for a determination of
whether a rational relation to interstate commerce exists.' 170 Furthermore,
the court brushed aside the civil foundation of the VAWA by characterizing it
as "criminal in nature" and found whatever differences might exist in the
inferential chain to be inconsequential. 171 Thus, the Brzonkala district court
asserted that the differences between the GFSZA in Lopez and the VAWA
actually amounted to similarities and that both regulated an activity "remote
from interstate commerce.' 7
2
of gender-based violence on interstate commerce for the sole purpose of overcoming the ration-
ality test and the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez .... ).
163 Id. (fearing that the Act would allow "domestic relations litigation to permeate the fed-
eral courts").
164 Id.
165 Id. (quoting United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1452 (6th Cir. 1996)).
166 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996). The plaintiff claimed that she had been raped three
times in a dormitory room and that the defendants subsequently made statements after the fact
that indicated their gender-based animus. Id. at 782.
167 Id. at 786.
168 Id. at 788-93.
169 Id. at 789-91 (discussing the differences between the VAWA and the GFSZA in a sec-
tion entitled "Possible Differences").
170 Id. at 790 (declaring that "the fact that the effects need not be inferred in this case is not
a very important difference" because the Lopez Court had findings and it still dismissed the
GFSZA).
171 Id. at 790-91 (stating that "[r]egardless, of whether a statute based on the Commerce
Clause is civil or criminal is of limited relevance. With statutes regulating intrastate activities,
the primary concern is whether the activity is economic" and characterizing the determination of
the inferential chain as an "inexact science").
172 Id. at 791.
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After reciting the similarities between the GFSZA and the VAWA, the
Brzonkala district court chastised the Doe court for arriving at a conclusion
contrary to established jurisprudence and supported its decision on federal-
ism grounds. 173 According to the Brzonkala district court, the Doe court mis-
applied Wickard because that case comprehended the regulation of acts
being commercial or economic in nature while the VAWA regulated an intra-
state activity with no apparent commercial or economic features.174 Empha-
sizing the VAWA's noncommercial and intrastate nature, the court reasoned
that allowing Congress to regulate intrastate acts "would have the practical
result of excessively extending Congress's power and of inappropriately tip-
ping the balance away from the states."1 75 Although the findings indicated
that gender-based violence had a "major effect on the national economy,"
they did not necessarily imply a substantial effect on interstate commerce
sufficient to bring an activity within the regulatory power of Congress.
176 If
such a chain of causation won the day, then Congress could regulate acts such
as insomnia, whose costs to the country equal or exceed those of domestic
violence. 177 In the end, the Brzonkala district court decided that Congress
extended its Commerce Clause power beyond its reach and into state affairs
by enacting the VAWA and that "[a]ny other conclusion would strain
reason."178
Following the district court decision in Brzonkala, the plaintiff filed an
appeal with the Fourth Circuit thereby giving it the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights remedy.179 Noting the precedential
weight of Lopez, the Fourth Circuit set out to determine whether gender-
based violence substantially affected interstate commerce.180 The court be-
gan by categorizing gender-based violence as not "even arguably commercial
or economic" and as lacking "a meaningful connection with any particular,
identifiable economic enterprise or transaction."' 81 In fact, the court argued
173 Id. at 791-93 (listing the similarities in a section confusingly titled "Similarities (Other
than those in the Possible Differences Section)" as the noneconomic nature of the VAWA and
the GFSZA, the absence of a jurisdictional element in both statutes, and both laws violate the
principle of federalism).
174 Id. at 791.
175 Id. at 792.
176 Id. (stating that "[s]howing that something affects the national economy does not suffice
to show that it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce").
177 Id. at 793 (reciting that insomnia costs the nation a reported $15 billion per year, in-
somniacs travel across state lines, and that insomniacs buy medicine that has traveled across
state lines).
178 Id,
179 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (reversing a divided panel of the Court of Appeals that reinstated the plaintiff's claim
under VAWA's civil rights remedy and upheld its constitutionality).
180 Id. at 830-33.
181 Id. at 834. The court maintained that
[t]he statute does not regulate the manufacture, transport, or sale of goods, the
provision of services, or any other sort of commercial transaction... [and] excludes
from its purview those violent crimes most likely to have an economic as-
pect ... and instead addresses violent crime arising from the irrational motive of
gender-based animus, a type of crime relatively unlikely to have any economic
character at all.
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that the GFSZA in Lopez fell more clearly in the category of commercial
regulation than the VAWA. 182 As a result, the VAWA failed to regulate eco-
nomic activity and to find otherwise "would divest the words 'commerce' and
'economic' of any real meaning. '183
To support its Commerce Clause conclusion, the Fourth Circuit analyzed
its decision in light of the principles of federalism. Lopez, according to the
Fourth Circuit, affirmed the proposition that courts must carefully weigh the
consequences of their decisions in terms of federalism so as not to "eliminate
all limits on federal power." 184 In this case, the only way to uphold the civil
rights remedy would be to find that gender-based violence substantially af-
fected interstate commerce. 185 In so concluding, however, a court would
have to rely "on arguments that lack any principled limitations and would, if
accepted, convert the power to regulate interstate commerce into a general
police power
m86
The VAWA's civil rights remedy not only regulated acts traditionally
punished by states, but it also provided a federal remedy in the absence of
state relief whether that absence resulted from state criminal law policy, the
discretion of the prosecutor, or state tort law policy.' 87 Moreover, the VAWA
blurred the division of accountability for the failure to punish gender-based
violence. s88 Allowing Congress to exceed its power in this fashion "would
arrogate to the federal government control of every area of activity that mat-
ters, reserving to the states authority over only the trivial and
insignificant. "189
Id.
182 Id. at 836.
183 Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995)). After finding no economic
aspects to the civil rights remedy, the court next examined the jurisdictional reach of the VAWA.
The court recited the rule from Lopez that a jurisdictional element ensures that "each specific
application of the regulation involves activity that in fact affects interstate commerce." Id. at
831. Applying the jurisdictional lesson from Lopez, the court observed that the civil rights rem-
edy lacked a jurisdictional element limiting action as for liability to those having an interstate
nexus. Id. at 836. Unlike section 13981, the criminal provisions of the VAWA attached jurisdic-
tion only to acts involving the crossing of state lines or Indian Territory. Id. The civil rights
remedy, on the other hand, failed to explicitly limit jurisdiction to acts with an interstate nexus
and did not "include any language which could possibly be construed to constitute such a juris-
dictional element." Id. Because the VAWA not only failed to regulate economic activity but
also lacked a jurisdictional element, the court declared that it could not uphold the statute under
Lopez or any other Supreme Court precedent. Id. As a result, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held the VAWA to be an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 905.
184 Id. at 837 (stating that a court has to evaluate its holdings in light of our federal system
of government).
185 Id. at 838.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 841-42.
188 Id. at 842 (noting that "[a]ccordingly, citizens of the States will not know which sover-
eign to hold accountable for any failure to address adequately gender-motivated crimes of
violence").
189 Id. at 844. Concluding its Commerce Clause and federalism discussion, the Fourth Cir-
cuit examined the power of Congress to enact the civil rights remedy under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court observed that Supreme Court precedent held that the Four-
teenth Amendment generally "confer[red] rights only against the states." Id. at 863. Moreover,
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the constitutionality
of VAWA's civil rights remedy in United States v. Morrison.90 Following its
summation of the Lopez principles, the Supreme Court applied Lopez to the
VAWA to determine its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. 91
The VAWA, according to a majority of the Court, failed to regulate economic
activity "in any sense of the phrase."'192 As a result, the cumulative effects of
gender-motivated intrastate violence could not be aggregated without violat-
ing precedent allowing aggregation only where the regulated act is economic
in nature.193 Although the Court noted the presence of the legislative find-
ings, it declared them to be "insufficient" to uphold Commerce Clause legis-
lation because the Court itself ultimately determines whether or not a given
activity substantially affected interstate commerce.194 The Court believed the
link between gender-based violence and interstate commerce to be too tenu-
the Supreme Court consistently indicated that "Congress' Section 5 power to enforce Section 1 is
correspondingly limited to remedial action against States and state actors." Id. Nevertheless,
the possibility remains that Congress may regulate private conduct by a statute that is invoked
only upon an "individualized showing that the State had violated the ... Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 867. In this case, however, the VAWA's civil rights remedy regulated purely pri-
vate conduct and failed to limit claims to those involving states, state officers, individuals acting
under color of state law, or those conspiring with state officials. For example, the petition in this
case did "not even intone, much less allege" that the defendants were state actors or involved the
state in any way. Id. at 870. Moreover, the VAWA remedy took effect whether or not an "indi-
vidualized showing of unconstitutional state action" is made or attempted. Id. at 870. Cases
arose under section 13981, according to the court, "without regard to whether the state ade-
quately enforces its applicable criminal or civil laws" and applied both to states enforcing their
laws and those turning "blind eye" toward gender-based violence. Id. To allow a statute of this
nature to stand, in the court's mind, would allow Congress to create a municipal code by which it
could control all the rights of citizens and destroy the legislative prerogatives of the individual
states. Id. Because the VAWA regulated purely private conduct without reference to state ac-
tion, the Fourth Circuit held that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment power when it
enacted section 13981 and declared that section to be unconstitutional. Id. When combined
with its previous Commerce Clause holding, the Fourth Circuit invalidated both constitutional
grounds upon which Congress based its enactment of VAWA's civil rights remedy.
190 529 U.S. 598 (2000), affg Brkonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d
820 (4th Cir. 1999) (case name changed due to United States intervention to defend the statute
and dismissal of plaintiff's Title IX claims against the school).
191 Id. at 607-19. The Court observed that it had the power to overrule congressional legis-
lation "only upon a plain showing" that Congress transgressed its constitutional authority. Id. at
607. Given this command, the Court investigated Congress's authority to enact the VAWA
under the Commerce Clause in light of its decision in Lopez. Despite the expansive nature of
modern Commerce Clause power, Lopez enumerated the bounds on Congress's commerce au-
thority, which made regulation constitutional so long as the regulated activity substantially af-
fected interstate commerce. Id. at 612. As a link to interstate commerce, Congress could
include a jurisdictional element to demonstrate that the regulation "is in pursuance of Congress'
regulation of interstate commerce." Although not required, legislative findings allow courts to
evaluate the rationality of the legislative decision linking the regulated act to interstate com-
merce. Id. Last, Lopez instructed that the link between the regulated act and interstate com-
merce could not be so tenuous as to allow Congress to regulate any act under its commerce
power. Id. If Congress possessed unlimited power, it could regulate acts historically regulated
by the states and thereby invade the state. Id. at 612-13.
192 Id. at 613.
193 Id. (reiterating that historical Commerce Clause jurisprudence only allows aggregation
where the regulated act is economic in nature).
194 Id. at 614 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
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ous to support Commerce Clause legislation.195 Accepting the rationale used
to support the VAWA would allow Congress to regulate "every attenuated
effect upon interstate commerce," such as murder or family law because their
effect on the nation's economy is significant in the aggregate.1 96 However, an
expansion of power in this fashion would be "to completely obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority."'197 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded the bounds of its power under
the Commerce Clause when it enacted the VAWA.1 98
Similar to past decisions involving federalism and the Commerce Clause,
four justices sharply disagreed in a dissent written by Justice Souter. 199 Like
the Fourth Circuit, the dissent argued that the role of the courts merely
amounted to determining whether a rational basis existed for the legislation
regardless of a court's view of the legislation's wisdom.20° To aid judicial re-
view, legislative findings must be given due weight because they represent
the facts upon which Congress relied when enacting legislation.20' In this
case, unlike the facts in Lopez, Congress amassed a "mountain of data" to
support its conclusion that gender-based violence substantially affected inter-
state commerce.20 2 Indeed, the dissent pointed out that the evidence sup-
porting the enactment of the VAWA was "far more voluminous than the
record compiled by Congress and found sufficient in two prior cases uphold-
ing Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Commerce Clause chal-
195 Id. at 615 (stating that the reasoning urged by the petitioners sought to follow a "but-for
causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime to every attenuated effect on interstate
commerce" that would allow Congress to regulate any crime).
196 Id. at 615-16.
197 Id. at 615 (noting that their concern about the obliteration "seems well founded").
198 Id. at 619. The Court also found the civil rights remedy to be unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Amendment only reaches state actors and not private ac-
tors. Id. at 619-27. The civil rights remedy was not aimed at the action of states, according to the
majority, but only at private individuals. Id. at 625-26. The Court observed that state-sponsored
discrimination violated equal protection unless it served "important governmental objectives us-
ing a discriminatory means.., substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id.
at 620. The Court, however, described congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment
as limited by the time-honored principle that the amendment prohibited only state action and
did not contemplate barring private conduct. Id. Although the Court noted the evidence point-
ing to bias against victims of gender-based violence in state courts, the Court found that the
VAWA proscribed the acts of individuals and not those of states. Id. at 625-26. In this case, for
example, the VAWA claim fails to indict any state official as a result of the attack on Brzonkala.
Id. at 626. Moreover, the Court argued that the VAWA's remedy was overbroad because it
applied to every state despite evidence that state court discrimination did not exist in every state.
Id. at 626-27. As a result, the Court concluded that Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment did not reach far enough to allow it to enact the VAWA and held it to be unconsti-
tutional. Id. at 627.
199 Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J.).
200 Id. at 638 (maintaining that the "business of the courts is to review the congressional
assessment, not for soundness but simply for the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional
basis exists in fact").
201 Id.
202 Id. at 628-29 (listing some of the evidence linking domestic violence and rape to inter-
state commerce used by Congress when it enacted the VAWA).
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lenges. '203 By ignoring the legislative record and the deference due to the
legislative judgment of Congress, the majority propounded a "new system of
congressional deference subject to selective discounts."
204
In addition to setting aside the legislative prerogatives of Congress, the
dissent urged that the majority opinion failed to take proper account of the
history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. History, according to the dissent,
demonstrated that the categorical labeling of regulated acts had "proven as
unworkable in practice as they are unsupportable in theory." 20 By examin-
ing previously rejected distinctions based upon the economic/noneconomic
nature of an activity, the majority sought to limit federal power to protect an
allegedly bright line marking the boundary of state sovereignty.20 6 However,
previous cases made clear that the federal government may legislate in areas
of state interest when it legislates under the auspices of a constitutionally
enumerated power.207 Moreover, the dissent maintained that even the Foun-
ders believed that politics, not judicial review, would sway the balance of
power between the federal and state governments as the economy
changed.20 Cases from Wickard to Garcia reiterated that the political pro-
cess sufficiently guarded against federal intrusion into state sovereignty. 209 In
the end, the dissent declared the majority opinion to be in error and
"doubt[ed] that the majority's view will prove to be enduring law. '210
IV. Political Accountability and Federalism
Two common themes run throughout the history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence: the fear of federal intrusion into state legislative prerogatives,
and the ability of the political process to protect those prerogatives. The no-
tion that the political process protects our dual structure of government is
derived from Herbert Wechsler's 1954 influential article titled The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Se-
203 Id. at 635 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
204 Id. at 638.
205 Id. at 640 (reasoning that the Commerce Clause singularly granted Congress power to
regulate commerce, that Congress may not regulate under that provision any subject that fails to
affect commerce, and that "[i]t does not at all follow that an activity affecting commerce none-
theless falls outside the commerce power, depending on the specific character of the activity, or
the authority of a State to regulate it along with Congress").
206 Id. at 644. The dissent asserted that
]ust as the old formalism had value in the service of an economic conception, the
new one is useful in serving a conception of federalism. It is the instrument by
which assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of preserving a sup-
posedly discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy to legislate or refrain from
legislating as the individual States see fit.
Id.
207 Id. at 645.
208 Id. at 647.
209 Id. at 649-50 (noting that although similar states' rights concerns were heard when the
end of state legislative election of senators ended, they did not prevent passage of the
amendment).
210 Id. at 654.
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lection of the National Government.2 11 In his piece, Wechsler asserts that
"[t]he actual extent of central intervention in the governance of our affairs is
determined far less by the formal power distribution than by the sheer exis-
tence of the states and their political power to influence the action of the
national authority. 2 12 To support his point, Wechsler asserted that the states
retained power over the national authority due to their role in the election of
Congress and the President.213 Individuals chosen to constitute the national
government are elected by citizens of states as mandated by the Constitution
and must be keenly aware of local sensitivities to be elected in the first
place.214 Because states and their interests play a key role in the composition
and selection of the federal government, local concerns within states "cannot
fail to find reflection in the Congress. a2 1 5 States, according to Wechsler, re-
mained "the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion,
the special centers of political activity. 2 16 Even Madison, Wechsler pointed
out, argued that the political process, not the judiciary, would constrain the
power of the national government.2 17 In the end, the design of the Constitu-
tion "is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by
the center on the domain of the states."
218
As evidence of the adaptive nature of the Constitution envisioned by
Wechsler, Court disputes about states' rights and the need for the judiciary to
safeguard federalism reflects ideas encompassed by Wechsler's theory. From
E. C. Knight Co. to Morrison, the Court typically voiced this concern by stat-
ing that a federal regulation will "obliterate" the distinction between what is
national and what is local. Underlying this obliteration is the notion that
political accountability is blurred when the national legislative power is
brought to bear upon traditionally state legislative concerns.
The best expression of the idea of blurred political accountability is
found in New York v. United States.219 In that case, Justice O'Connor opined
that Congress possessed significant powers to govern the nation, which in-
cludes areas of state concern, but does not include the power to force states
211 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
212 Id. at 544.
213 Id. at 546-58 (stating that "[i]f I have drawn too much significance from the mere fact of
the existence of the states, the error surely will be rectified by pointing also to their crucial role
in the selection and composition of the national authority").
214 Id. at 547.
215 Id. (urging that "[t]o the extent that federalist values have real significance they must
give rise to local sensitivity to central intervention; to the extent that such a local sensitivity
exists, it cannot fail to find reflection in the Congress").
216 Id. at 546.
217 Id. at 558 (stating that "the inherent tendency" necessitates "the widest support before
intrusive measures of importance can receive significant consideration, reacting readily to oppo-
sition grounded in resistance within the states").
218 Id. But see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers".
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995) (arguing generally that
Wechsler's theory is out of touch with the modern political process); John C. Yoo, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1311 (1997) (discussing the new federalism).
219 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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to govern according to their directives 220 State officers regulate local mat-
ters, and remain responsive to local concerns because they suffer the conse-
quences of a dissatisfied local electorate.221 Where the federal government
displaces state prerogatives, however, the political accountability of govern-
mental officers becomes blurred because state officials may suffer the electo-
ral consequences despite being forced to implement federal mandates
designed by federal officials.2 2 State voters could become confused as to
which governmental body is responsible for the regulation of local concerns
when federal law invades state affairs. If citizens dislike the implemented
federal policy, they may vote to remove state officials despite their lack of
involvement with the legislative process or the legislation itself;223 therefore,
federal officials are "insulated from the electoral ramifications of their deci-
sions." 2 4  In the end, political "[a]ccountability is thus diminished
when ... elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views
of the local electorate.. ." and must comply with laws drafted by the federal
government.22
As evidence of the persistent disagreement about the political safe-
guards of federalism in recent cases, the Morrison dissent reasoned that polit-
ics had long been considered "the determinant of the federal balance within
the broad limits of a power like commerce. '226 Moreover, Supreme Court
precedent from Wickard to Garcia reaffirmed that the Constitution left both
"conflicts of economic interest" and "conflicts of sovereign political inter-
ests" to be resolved by the political process.227 Although developments such
as national growth and the Seventeenth Amendment reduced state power,
the dissent urged that the Constitution contained no "circuit breaker" to pre-
vent results of the political process.2 These political consequences, accord-
ing to the dissent, did not amount to holes in the Constitution that needed to
be judicially repaired, but are legitimate results of the political restraints on
the federal system intended by the Framers.2 9
Examining the role of politics in maintaining the state-federal balance,
the Morrison majority asserted that the Framers divided the power distribu-
tion at the federal level so that the Constitution would not be defined only by
public opinion and legislative self-restraint.2 0 Although politics affected
constitutional interpretation and application, the judiciary ultimately enjoyed
220 Id. at 162.
221 Id. at 168.




226 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 648 (2000).
227 Id. at 649.
228 Id. at 650.
229 Id. at 652 (stating that "[a]mendments that alter the balance of power between the Na-
tional and State Governments, like the Fourteenth, or that change the way the States are repre-
sented within the Federal Government, like the Seventeenth, are not rips in the fabric of the
Framers' Constitution, inviting judicial repairs").
230 Id. at 616 n.7 (characterizing Justice Souter's defense of the political process as
"remarkable").
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the power to define what is a constitutional exercise of power.23 1 Political
accountability as understood by the dissent thus departed from the "cardinal
rule of constitutional law," which is that the judiciary determines what the
law is regardless of legislative enactments.23 2 According to the majority, the
accountability of politicians for their legislative acts only restrained the com-
merce power of Congress "within that power's outer bounds." 23 3 Wielding its
power, the majority concluded that giving effect to the VAWA would blur the
distinction between national and local authority to regulate matters of local
concern. 23 4 Thus, political accountability only affected the state-federal bal-
ance within the sphere of permissible regulation; it did not define the sphere
because that task belonged uniquely to the judiciary.23 5
Taking up its unique task, the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison rep-
resents the Court's continuing effort to protect the states from what it views
as the ever-expanding power of the federal government. Indeed, the Court's
recent decisions reflect its willingness to jealously guard state authority by
supporting positions that decentralize power.23 6 Scholars refer to the redis-
covered barrier between federal and state legislative authority brought about
by judicial activism as the "new federalism. '237 The Court's infatuation with
the new federalism harkens back to the past when previous Courts commonly
held Congress's power to enact national legislation finite. Moreover, the new
federalism rejects the holding in Garcia and discards Wechsler's "political
safeguards theory" of federalism. 23 8 However, the new federalism disserves
the law by protecting states' rights in a manner unsupported by historical
precedent. 239 Moreover, the new federalism allows justices to make decisions
based upon individual preferences without reference to precedent. The
David-like Supreme Court is not supposed to slay the Goliath-like Congress
in the name of states' rights based upon personal conceptions of governmen-
tal operation. David merely checks Goliath.
By continuing to discredit the political safeguards of federalism, particu-
larly in a case like Morrison, the Supreme Court, not Congress by its legisla-
tion, blurs the political accountability of local and federal officials. The
indispensable element of the political accountability theory is that citizens
must recognize which officials are responsible for legislative acts so that they
231 Id. at 617 n.7.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 617-18 (reasoning that the decision preserved the historical theme that the regula-
tion of intrastate violence having nothing to do with the instrumentalities, goods, or channels of
interstate commerce should be regulated by the states).
235 Id. at 617 n.7.
236 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding the Brady Act's require-
ment that state officials perform background checks before selling firearms to be unconstitu-
tional); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 unconstitutional on the basis of federalism).
237 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND.
L. REv. 27 (1998); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1311
(1997).
238 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" But Missing the Beat:
Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 13 (1998).
239 See infra Part V.
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can demonstrate their approval for those acts by voting to retain or remove
those officials. By invalidating popular congressional legislation, however,
the Court injects confusion into the political arena because citizens cannot
determine who has the ability to remedy a national problem. Citizens look to
the federal government to remedy problems that are national in scope and to
deal with issues about which the individual states are incompetent. Indeed,
the Supreme Court noted this role of the federal government in National
League of Cities when it opined that some problems could pose such a threat
that "only collective action by the National Government might forestall."240
Given the evidence presented to Congress during the VAWA's hearings, gen-
der-based violence cannot be considered anything but a national problem.
Because gender-based violence is a problem with national dimensions,
the federal government is the only body that can completely address the is-
sue. The evidence presented to Congress documented that state justice sys-
tems failed to adequately redress gender-based violence.241 Recognizing the
discriminatory treatment gender-based violence victims received from states,
the popularly elected federal officials who represent individual states and
their associated interests chose to enact the VAWA to combat the problem.
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of states supported the VAWA based
upon the declarations of the popularly elected state attorneys general. For
example, the National Association of Attorneys General supported the
VAWA by a unanimous vote.242 Furthermore, attorneys general from thirty-
eight states affirmed the need for the VAWA's civil rights remedy, stating
that "the current system for dealing with violence against women is inade-
quate. ' 243 Even when litigants challenged the VAWA in the Court, thirty-six
of the states filed amicus briefs arguing for the constitutionality of the mea-
sure.244 On the other side, only one state filed a brief urging the Court to
find the civil rights provision unconstitutional 2 45 Given the extensive state
support and the assent of the national legislature, the VAWA is not a legisla-
tive intrusion on states' rights, but rather an example of the cooperative fed-
eralism required to address areas of national concern.
Despite their federalism concerns, the Morrison majority overlooks the
differences between areas of law such as family law and gender-based vio-
lence. While citizens do not want or need an overly intrusive federal govern-
240 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976).
241 See, e.g., S. RET. No. 102-197, at 47 (1991) (citing a Colorado Gender Bias Task Force
survey showing that 41% of surveyed judges believe juries give sexual assault victims less credi-
bility than victims of other crimes); id. at 44 (stating that less than 1% of all rape victims have
collected damages from their attackers).
242 ld. at 37-38.
243 Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender, supra note 33, at 34-36.
244 See Brief of Amici Curiae the States of Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennes-
see, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths of
Massachusetts and Puerto Rico for Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
245 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the State of Alabama for Respondents, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
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ment, the regulation of gender-based violence does not provide a basis for
the expansion of federal power at the expense of the states. Gender-based
violence is a problem that differs from the areas mentioned by the Morrison
Court in that citizens recognize it as a national problem incompatible with
state resolution. The areas of state concern cited by the various courts that
encountered the Brzonkala claim-i.e., divorce, child-rearing, marriage, and
insomnia-are not recognized as national problems in the same manner be-
cause there is no popular support for federal intrusion under present circum-
stances. Although the Brzonkala district court may be correct that insomnia
affects interstate commerce more than gender-based violence, private and
public interest groups do not lobby for the federal regulation of insomnia like
they did in support of the VAWA. The situation would change if, for exam-
ple, insomniacs killed thousands of people every year in a manner uncontrol-
lable by state police. Under such circumstances, cries would ring out for
federal intervention and courts, cognizant of public opinion, would support
federal intervention. Similarly, the public, through its elected officials, does
not perceive a crisis in state handling of marriage, divorce, or child-rearing;
therefore, it does not support federal regulation of these areas and no federal
action will arise. Thus, comparing gender-based violence to acts like insom-
nia or family law misapprehends the connection between supportive public
opinion and federal intervention.
In addition to disregarding the popular assent that brought the VAWA
into being, the Supreme Court's invalidation of the civil rights remedy puts
local electorates in an untenable position. Voting to remove either state or
federal officials from office threatens to alter state or federal support for the
fight against gender-based violence if newly elected officials turn a deaf ear
to the issue. Failing to support legislative remedies or ignoring the issue alto-
gether leaves the discriminatory status quo in place. For example, newly
elected state politicians could refuse to enact further legislation because of
the remedies already available under state law, thereby ignoring their ineffec-
tiveness.246 Furthermore, newly elected federal politicians will hesitate to
tackle the issue again so closely on the heels of Morrison's defeat. As a re-
sult, Morrison's reliance on the local electorate to address gender-based vio-
lence risks perpetuating a problem that Congress had crafted a national
solution to address.
In Morrison, the Court simply chose to elevate its concern about ex-
panding federal power above the public's desire for an avenue of redress for
victims of gender-based violence. However, picking and choosing among
policies separated from public opinion is an option for the Supreme Court
246 Even though there was broad public support for VAWA, state officials are unlikely to
act without an opportunity for political gain. Because the problem is so pervasive, they are
likely to view it as one that they cannot fix and, therefore, will avoid the problem because politi-
cal gain will come only through solving the problem. The pervasive nature of the problem not
only diminishes political gain, but counsels against trying to fix the problem. State officials might
be loathe to create solutions to which the judiciary might disagree or fight. As a result, it is
easier to do nothing on the state level and throw blame on the federal government for its failure
to rectify the problem. In other words, moving political accountability elsewhere, which pre-
vents political loss, might actually be a gain in the world of politics.
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due to its unique position in the structure of our government. Although the
Court frequently asserts that transgressions of federal power blur the lines of
political accountability, they can do so precisely because they themselves are
politically unaccountable for their decisions. As one Anti-Federalist noted
during the debate over ratification, "[t]he opinions of the supreme court,
whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power
provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their
adjudications. '247 Judicial activism, then, is a byproduct of the inability to
match judicial decisions to political consequences. For example, there can be
little doubt that a substantial movement would have arisen to remove Justice
Blackmun from the Court after his opinion in Roe v. Wade if political conse-
quences fell upon justices after making their decisions.248 Given the support
of the VAWA, several justices would have to perform a graceful two-step to
dance around the political consequences of their decisions in Morrison. In
short, the mismatch between judicial decisions and politics allows the Court
"to stumble around the United States Code, heedlessly striking down federal
laws in what amounts to a treacherous game of blind man's bluff with the
Constitution and the American government" that is out of touch with popu-
lar opinion.
249
V. A History of Unlearned Lessons
A. Judicial Activism
Despite the Court's reliance on historical precedent to support its invali-
dation of the VAWA, history itself counsels that the judicial activism exhib-
ited by the Court in cases like Morrison is unwarranted. Indeed, whether the
Framers understood judicial review as allowing the type of judicial activism
employed by the modem Court to be in the Constitution is "the crucial issue
of American constitutional history." 25 0 Nonetheless, the now familiar reli-
ance on historical pronouncements regarding judicial power is found in Mor-
rison. Justifying judicial review, the Morrison majority asserted that the
Framers divided power at the federal level "so that the Constitution's provi-
sions would not be defined solely by the political branches nor the scope of
legislative power limited only by public opinion and the legislature's self-re-
straint."251 As Hamilton noted, "[tihe interpretation of the laws is the proper
and peculiar province of the courts. '252 Although politics play a role in con-
stitutional interpretation and application, the Morrison majority maintained
that the federal judiciary is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Con-
247 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 186 (1996) (quoting the Anti-Federalist
Brutus).
248 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (granting the right to abortion under certain
circumstances).
249 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 291 (2000).
250 RAKOVE, supra note 247, at 175 (relating the Supremacy Clause to the doctrine of judi-
cial review).
251 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000).
252 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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stitution. '253 Further asserting its power in Commerce Clause cases, the
Morrison majority reiterated that whether Congress can exercise regulatory
power under the Commerce Clause "is ultimately a judicial rather than a
legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court. 25 4 These
statements reflect the vital link between the written law embodied in a con-
stitution and the faith in competence of a judiciary to decide issues involving
the constitution.
While the public might have faith in the Court's constitutional interpre-
tation, the Court's characterization of the evolution of judicial review mis-
construes the historical record.255 Although the Framers intended judicial
review to apply to federal legislation, they believed that most of the contro-
versies requiring judicial intervention would involve the federalism structure
of the government.25 6 Before the Constitution, several state legislatures in-
terpreted their constitutions at their whims and passed laws in contravention
of constitutional guarantees. 257 Moreover, the failure of the states to act in
the best interest of the nation under the Articles of Confederation convinced
the Framers that the nation needed constitutional reform 58 In fact, many
Framers believed that the continuing failure of the states to act for the na-
tional good resulted from state politics.259 In order to progress, the nation
253 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7.
254 Id. at 614 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 559, 557 n.2).
255 But see generally Kramer, supra note 249, at 240-50; RAKOVE, supra note 247, at 171-80.
According to Rakove, in addition to sweeping assertions of power based upon precedent, the
text of the Constitution and the writings of some of its Framers support the Court's view of
judicial review. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, one primary concern of the Fram-
ers involved the separation of authority between federal and state legislatures "in controversies
relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions." Id. at 176 (quoting THE FEDERALIsT
No. 39 (James Madison)). As an alternative to giving Congress a negative over all state laws if it
found them repugnant to the Constitution, the Framers drafted the Supremacy Clause thereby
making the nation's laws the supreme law of the land and binding the states regardless of con-
trary state law. Id. at 172-74. By creating the Supremacy Clause, the Framers incorporated "a
principle of judicial review into all the state governments by the unilateral fiat of the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 175. Reaffirming the role of the judicial branch of the national government,
Madison noted that the body to decide disputes over national/state authority to regulate "is to be
established under the general government." Id. at 176 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
Madison)). Moreover, Hamilton observed in Federalist 78 that "the courts were designed to be
an intermediate body between the people and the legislature; in order, among other things, to
keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 395
(Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992). In the end, the rejection of the proposed nega-
tive on state laws paved the way for a clause that endowed the judiciary with the ability to
enforce nationally supreme laws so long as courts could be relied upon to responsibly enforce
national laws.
256 RAKOVE, supra note 247 at 175 (stating that "the more likely sources of constitutional
controversy requiring judicial review did not lie along the axis of the separation of powers-that
is, within the realm of national government alone. They would arise instead along the unchar-
tered borders where the powers of state and national governments would overlap").
257 Kramer, supra note 249, at 238.
258 RAKOVE, supra note 245, at 29 (noting that the inability of the states to approve amend-
ments to the Articles, to meet the financial needs of Congress, and to implement the Treaty of
Paris all contributed to the desire for reform).
259 Kramer, supra note 249, at 243-44 (claiming that the states had a "bad history of ignor-
ing both the Articles of Confederation and their own state constitutions").
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needed a mechanism to enforce national laws against the states to secure the
welfare of the nation.
260
To protect the national government from the parochial interests of the
states, the Framers drafted the Supremacy Clause, thereby elevating national
laws above those of the states.261 Against this background of state recalci-
trance, however, a different image of the Supremacy Clause emerges. The
judicial review comprehended by the Supremacy Clause protected the na-
tional government from encroachment by the states, and not vice versa as the
Supreme Court typically implies. Indeed, the use of judicial review as a
method to protect the states from federal overreaching received little to no
attention at the Constitutional Convention.262 Moreover, state ratifying con-
ventions generally did not contemplate judicial review at all and if they did,
the discussion remained as a side note to matters considered more impor-
tant.263 The Framers simply "hoped to create a national government strong
enough to resist the states' relentless encroachments and capable of acting on
its own."'264 As a result, the Framers had "little reason to worry that Con-
gress would enact or the president approve constitutionally improper statutes
that the federal judiciary would feel compelled to overturn. '265 In short, "no
one in the Founding generation would have imagined that courts could or
should play a prominent role in defining the limits of federal power.
266
Given the experiences and political concerns of the Framers, the failure
to highlight judicial review in the Constitution is not surprising. The Framers
wrote the Constitution in the wake of both the American Revolution and the
Glorious Revolution during which a ruling hand had been overthrown by the
sword.267 As a result, the Framers had over a century of experience in a
federal system that provided them with a model of how to prevent transgres-
sions of power.268 In the minds of the Framers, then, the chief mechanism by
which to control a body exceeding its authority involved the mobilization of
popular opinion against abuses of power. 269 Whether the organization of the
public included protests like those against the Stamp Act or outright violence
like that during the Revolution, the Framers understood popular action to be
260 RAKovE, supra note 247, at 28-31 (describing how the Articles of Confederation and
the nature of state internal politics spurred the constitutional reform).
261 Kramer, supra note 249, at 243-44.
262 Id. at 242 (asserting that the little attention paid to judicial review at the Convention is
"old news-and not very important news either" because the ratifiers had a different conception
of the power to change laws).
263 Id. at 246-52. Kramer observes that the ratification debates more accurately reflect the
understanding of judicial review at the time of the Founding, but the evidence from those de-
bates "is even harder to square with the idea that the Constitution assigned courts responsibility
for defining the limits of federal power." Id. at 246. Moreover, the absence of evidence support-
ing the expansive role of judicial review at the Founding "utterly discredits any notion that fed-
eral courts were an important element of the design to protect state sovereignty." Id. at 252.
264 Id. at 246.
265 RAKOVE, supra note 247, at 175.
266 Kramer, supra note 249, at 235 (continuing in the next sentence, "And no one did").
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the only certain way to prevent tyrannical government. 270 In the end, "the
idea of depending on courts to stop a legislature that abused its power simply
never occurred" to most of the Framers at either the Constitutional or state-
ratifying conventions.
271
As a corollary to the ability of the people to resist an overreaching au-
thority, the Framers committed the ability to interpret the Constitution to the
people themselves. The Framers knew that the Constitution would have to
be interpreted based upon ambiguities inherent in the usage of language to
convey ideas.272 Rather than endow the judiciary with sole interpretive au-
thority, the Framers believed that uncertainty in meaning should be resolved
by politics or popular action.273 By assigning power to the people, the Fram-
ers implicitly held that permitting judges to decide disputes over constitu-
tional meaning "violated core principles of republicanism."2 74 Although
judges possessed the power to enforce standards to which the public popu-
larly assented, they had no power to outline the boundaries of constitutional
power.2 75 Allowing the judiciary to do so usurped a function that rightly be-
longed to the citizens of the nation.2 76 Furthermore, despite the support for
judicial review in Federalist 78, even Hamilton noted that "the power of the
people is superior to both" the legislative and judicial power.2 77 As a result,
history disavows any notion asserting that the Framers designed the federal
courts to be the ultimate protectors of state sovereignty.
Given the power that the Framers believed resided with the people, the
Morrison decision contravenes that power in favor of the power of the judici-
ary. By deeming the VAWA to be an unconstitutional exercise of power, the
Supreme Court mistakenly ignores the political process that resulted in the
VAWA and disregards the legislative judgment of a co-equal branch of gov-
ernment that a vast majority of states supported. While the majority in Mor-
rison voices implicit concerns about confusion regarding political
accountability, it reached a conclusion contrary to the political will of the
people. Because the elected officials of both state and federal governments
supported the VAWA, the consent of the people is represented in its enact-
ment. The citizens of each state voted to place individuals in office that they
believed best represented their interests. Although federal officials legislate
with an eye toward the national welfare, they presumably do not forget the
interest of their local constituency. For example, federal representatives of
North Carolina are unlikely to support legislation banning the use of tobacco
in this country because such legislation would snuff out the nation's cigarette
270 Id. (calling the mobilization of popular opinion "the blueprint" for opposing an abusive
government).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 237 (noting that the Framers realized that this might involve lengthy periods of
uncertainty or even controversy).
273 Id.
274 Id. (defining those principles as involving the resolution of constitutional disputes by the
sovereign citizens).
275 Id. at 240 (observing that judges had no power to define the scope of constitutional
limits where those limits were not "plainly settled").
276 Id.
277 THE FEDERALISt No. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
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industry. In the case of gender-based violence, the popularly elected mem-
bers of Congress reviewed ample evidence demonstrating the discriminatory
treatment of victims of gender-based animus in state judicial systems. How-
ever, the Supreme Court deemed their review of the evidence linking vio-
lence to interstate commerce to be irrational, thereby overturning the
conclusion of a majority of states and their politically accountable officials.
Because of the Morrison decision, "the States will be forced to enjoy the new
federalism whether they want it or not."278
B. State-Sponsored Discrimination
While the ultimate governing power resides with the people, history
teaches that such power allows states to discriminate against disfavored
groups. Indeed, the history of state-sponsored discrimination should give the
Supreme Court pause before it strikes down anti-discrimination legislation.
Despite its benefits, the history of federalism demonstrates that it has al-
lowed for the subordination of minority groups whose opinions or interests
do not align with those of the majority at the local level. As a result, our
form of government eternally runs the risk of majoritarian misrule. Discrimi-
nation has occurred most often at the hands of local control. As a result, the
Supreme Court's emphasis on decentralizing power from the federal govern-
ment to state government increases the opportunity for discrimination.
In the minds of some of the Framers, the risk of majoritarian misrule
increases as the level of government decreases. Referring to state govern-
ment, Madison opined that
[t]he smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct par-
ties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and
interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same
party;... and the smaller the compass within which they are placed,
the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression.279
On the other hand, the risk of oppression decreased at the national level
because the greater number of interests made it less probable that a majority
would have an incentive to trample minority rights.280 Thus, the national
government, not state government with its understanding of local concerns,
best protects the interests of minority groups.
A glance at the past confirms that smaller governmental units fail to
protect minority interests because history is littered with examples of the
abuse of state power in a manner harmful to various groups. The most glar-
ing instance of state-sponsored discrimination is the plight of African-Ameri-
cans in this country. Beginning at the Founding, the Southern states banded
278 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Wechsler, supra note 211, at 559 (stating that "the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes
its interpretation of the Constitution to that of the Congress in the interest of the states, whose
representatives control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in
sanctioning the challenged Act of Congress").
279 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
280 Id.
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together to protect their "peculiar institution" of slavery.281 At the Conven-
tion, a South Carolina delegate linked federalism to slavery by exclaiming
that the Southern states had
a security that the general government can never emancipate them,
for no such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on all hands that
the general government has no powers but what are expressly
granted by the Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were
reserved by the several states,28 2
Moreover, one delegate asserted that "[t]he morality and wisdom of slavery
are considerations belonging to the states themselves. '283 Because of the
slavery issue, the great divide at the Convention did not lie between large
and small states, but between Northern and Southern states.2 4 Despite the
persistent disagreement about slavery, delegates knew that a spirit of com-
promise had to prevail if the Constitution had any hope of being ratified by
the states. As a result, the final Constitution contained important conces-
sions to Southern states such as the Fugitive Slave Clause, the prohibition on
restricting slave importation, and the infamous Three-Fifths Clause.
285
Though included for the political purposes of ratification, the Constitution
represented to many "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell."
286
In spite of the freedom offered to the slaves after the Civil War, the
promises of the Reconstruction went unfulfilled as the Southern states er-
ected laws that perpetuated the pre-War social system. Almost all of the
Confederate states passed, for example, the Black Codes in an attempt to
retain their pre-War lifestyle.28 7 Mississippi, for example, enacted laws
preventing an African-American from testifying in cases where all of the par-
ties were white and returned African-Americans to their employers if they
quit without good cause.28 8 In short, the Southern states mobilized their legal
resources in a manner that replaced slavery with a kind of social caste system.
The newly freed African-American experienced the same disabilities they
had before the war-only the legal maneuvering required to continue their
plight changed.
Reacting to the South's continued discrimination against African-Ameri-
cans, Congress passed anti-discrimination schemes such as the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and wrote four Civil Rights Acts
into law by 1875.289 Despite. these federal protections, some Southern states
281 FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 218 (citing KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE "PECULIAR" INSTI-
TUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956)).
282 Pace Jefferson McConkie, Civil Rights and Federalism Fights: Is There a "More Perfect
Union" for the Heirs to the Promise of Broivn, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 389, 391 (1996) (quoting
PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY 23-24 (1981)
(quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 254-55 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) (statement of Charles Pinckney))).
283 RAKOVE, supra note 247, at 87 (statement of delegate Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut).
284 Id. at 72.
285 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
286 RAKOVE, supra note 247, at 58 (statement of William Lloyd Garrison).
287 FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 504.
288 Id. (citing 1865 Miss. Laws chs. 4, 6).
289 GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 880-81 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment embodied
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created laws forcing a separation between the races during the Jim Crow
era.290 In 1891, for example, a Georgia law mandated separate railroad cars
for African-Americans and whites while Arkansas required separate accom-
modations for its African-American and white prisoners in 1903.291 Even the
Supreme Court gave its support to the principle of segregation in Plessy v.
Ferguson292 by upholding a Louisiana law that required "equal but separate
accommodations" for "white" and "colored" railroad passengers. 293 Refer-
ring to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court argued that "it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to en-
force social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. '294 According to the Court,
laws separating the races and those regulating their interactions had long
been recognized "as within the competency of state legislatures in the exer-
cise of their police power."295 As a result, states remained free to regulate
the interaction between the races based upon their sovereignty.
Further succumbing to states' rights, the Supreme Court responded to
the charge that upholding the Louisiana law allowed the states to regulate
matters on the basis of physical characteristics.296 In the face of this asser-
tion, the Court committed such decisions to the discretion of state legisla-
tures. The Supreme Court opined that "the exercise of the police power
must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith
for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppres-
sion of a particular class. '297 State legislatures could reasonably enact laws
that accounted for "established usages, customs and traditions of the people,
and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of
the public peace and good order. '298 As a result, the Louisiana law did not
stamp African-Americans with a "badge of inferiority" and the only way to
perceive such a badge was if "the colored race chooses to put that construc-
tion on it.''299 However, Plessy not only disregarded the history of slavery,
the Emancipation Proclamation, the Fourteenth Amendment ratified the Civil Rights Act of
1866, the Fifteenth Amendment provided voting rights, the 1866 Act put an end to the Black
Codes, the 1870 Act dealt with denial of voting rights, the 1871 Act established civil and criminal
liabilities as enforcement for the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 1875 Act dealt with public
accommodations discrimination); FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 505-08 (observing that the Court
found the 1875 Act to be unconstitutional).
290 FRIEDMA , supra note 57, at 506 (referring to the era after Reconstruction that placed
African-Americans in "a system of legal and social apartheid" throughout many Southern
states).
291 d. at 506.
292 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
293 Id. at 540.
294 Id. at 544 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment "undoubtedly" was meant to make
the races equal).
295 Id.
296 Id. at 549 (responding to the argument that allowing discrimination on the basis of skin
color would thus allow discrimination on the basis of other qualities like hair color, nationality,
or alienage).
297 Id. at 550.
298 Id- (noting that the Louisiana law did no more offense to the Fourteenth Amendment
than the acts of Congress requiring segregated schools in Washington, D.C.).
299 Id. at 551.
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but also ignored the present status of African-Americans in the South who
faced repercussions, such as lynching, if they violated the laws designed to
protect the peace and comfort of the people. In the end, Plessy reflected
Madison's fear of state legislative misrule-a fear that African-Americans
would not overcome in a legal sense until Brown v. Board of Education.300
Even after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, Southern supporters of states' rights remained wedded to the out-
wardly subordinating concept of segregation. The Virginia legislature issued
a mandate opposing "further encroachment by the Supreme Court" and
hoped that the Virginia judiciary would protect the state against further fed-
eral intrusion. 30 1 Moreover, the Virginia "Defenders of State Sovereignty"
called for schools to be closed if they became integrated and for concomitant
tuition payments to be made on behalf of children attending different schools
because of integration.302 Similarly, the Alabama and Arkansas legislatures
opposed Brown because it invaded their state sovereignty by imposing on
their authority to regulate their educational systems.303 By insisting on local
control, the Southern states gained a valuable trump card to play in the na-
tional political arena by making national efforts only possible when African-
Americans were excluded from the agenda.304 Despite its renowned decision
in Brown, "[t]he inescapable conclusion is that federalism protected slavery
for the first seven decades of the nation's history. Then, for nearly another
century, it served as a reliable fortress for the perpetuation of systemic racial
segregation and discrimination. '305
Although the African-American experience graphically depicts the ever-
present threat of state-sponsored discrimination, other groups have also paid
the price of local control that Madison so feared. The poor, for example,
have long experienced discriminatory treatment at the hands of local offi-
cials. Indeed, the fundamental tenet upon which a community cared for its
poor historically revolved around local control. 30 6 In the nineteenth century,
for example, many individuals viewed the poor as idlers and communities
failed to aid the poor with the benefit of laws designed to improve their lot in
life. 30 7 In fact, nineteenth century communities "resented" the money paid to
support their own poor and designed poor laws "to deter, to make poverty
300 FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 508 (characterizing the Court's stance as "studied igno-
rance (or disregard)"); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ending school segregation).
301 The Honorable Linwood Holton, A Former Governor's Reflection on Massive Resis-
tance in Virginia, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15, 19 (1992) (citing ROBIN L. GATES, THE MAKING
of MASSIVE RESISTANCE 110 (1962)).
302 Id. at 18 (citing ROBIN L. GATES, THE MAKING of MASSIVE RESISTANCE 49 (1962)).
303 See McConkie, supra note 282, at 399-400 (citing ARK. CONST. amend. XLIV (repealed
1990); All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, July 27, 1995) (quoting Gov.
George Wallace (June 11, 1963))).
304 Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for
the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 592 n.164 (1998) (citing ROBERT C.
LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE WELFARE STATE 7-8 (1998)).
305 Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 233-34 (1996).
306 FRIEDMAN, supra note 57, at 213.
307 Id. at 214 (maintaining that a poor individual was also viewed as "a profligate, a
weakling").
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unpalatable, to make relief come bitter and dear.1308 Because the notion of
"settlement" fixed responsibility as to which community supported any par-
ticular impoverished person, towns frequently brought suit against one an-
other as a last-ditch effort to regain support monies.309 Furthermore, if a
poor person happened upon a new town, the townspeople sometimes greeted
the individual by physically removing them to a point beyond the community
line so as to prevent "settlement" and the resulting costs of support or litiga-
tion.310 To offset the costs of care if a person avoided physical removal and
got settled, local communities often auctioned off the care of the poor to the
lowest bidder who received labor in exchange for providing a meager subsis-
tence.311 In sum, placing responsibility for the care of the poor in the hands
of local communities created "an engine of sheer exploitation" in the nine-
teenth century that would not break down until centralized governmental
welfare.
312
Despite the modern promise of nationally administered welfare for the
poor, recent policies of states and local communities continue to work to the
disadvantage of the poor. In 1996, Congress repealed a sixty-year-old grant
program by enacting the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, which provided monetary entitlements to states to care
for the poor in a section titled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF).313 Consistent with the new federalism, Congress enacted the TANF
because it believed that states and local communities would create relief pro-
grams better suited to local concerns and be politically accountable for their
decisions.314 Echoing its federalism concerns, the TANF recites that one of
its goals is to "restore[ ] the States' fundamental role in assisting needy fami-
lies. '315 To further its goal, the TANF allows the states to fashion poor relief
programs in the manner they desire as long as they are "fair and equitable"
and do not violate constitutional protections. 316 Under the TANF, the states
receive a fixed amount of money to spend on poor relief regardless of the
number of individuals applying for such relief. 317 Because the TANF allows
states to keep excess funds not used for welfare spending, states have a major
incentive to decrease welfare costs and funnel the savings to other projects.318
Although people are no longer physically removed from communities, the
devolution of poor relief from federal to local control fails to aid the impov-
erished much as it failed in the past.
308 Id. at 214-15.
309 Id. at 215-16 (citing Litchfield v. Farmington, 7 Conn. 100 (Conn. 1828)).
310 Id. at 216 (discussing the process of "warning out," meaning that a town would warn a
person not to settle there without getting permission from the town, which prevented settlement
and the accompanying liability).
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 See Cashin, supra note 304, at 553 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)).
314 Id. at 566 (deeming the federalism rhetoric to be instrumental in passing the TANF).
315 Id. at 558 (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-725, at 261 (1996)).
316 Id. at 559 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 602).
317 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 609).
318 Id.
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Underlying the failure of the TANF to care for the poor is the idea of
the alignment of majority interest that so influenced Madison at the Found-
ing. In the case of the TANF, the faction wielding control is the middle class,
whose interests run counter to welfare relief.319 When states are given discre-
tion to use funds as they wish, the middle-class benefits because state politics
is largely middle class politics. 320 To maintain their political standing, politi-
cians must support programs that benefit the most voters, and most voters
are included in the middle class. As a result, money intended to aid the poor
flows into more politically attractive projects that benefit more people like
hospitals, roads, or parks.3 21 Furthermore, state policy often makes new
communities rely on the collection of local taxes for support, which allows
communities to give effect to their biases by excluding people from the com-
munity who cannot contribute to its support.322 Combining the state welfare
cuts and spending in local communities based upon middle-class bias, the
TANF actually contributes to the problems facing the poor rather than allevi-
ating them. Ultimately, the decentralization of regulation applauded under
the new federalism allows state majorities to ignore the welfare of the
minority.
Like the poor and African-Americans, women have also suffered dis-
criminatory treatment at the hands of state regulators throughout history.
Much of the discrimination women have faced results from the continuing
vitality of Victorian beliefs that largely confined a woman's work to the do-
mestic sphere. 323 In the past, even the Supreme Court supported the
noneconomic societal role of women by upholding the right of Illinois to ex-
clude women from the practice of law based upon notions of state sover-
eignty couched in Victorian terms.324 Denying women admission to the bar,
the Supreme Court asserted that
[m]an is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natu-
ral and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The con-
stitution of the family organization, which is found in the divine or-
dinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions
of womanhood.... The paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator.325
319 Id. at 591.
320 Id. at 584.
321 Id. at 583 (noting that public finance scholars have found that federal monies to states
via grants-in-aid programs go toward public expenditures and not toward human services).
322 Id. at 589 (observing also that state and local legislative bodies frequently label their
support programs to circumvent federal requirements).
323 ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS 16-18 (1980) (stating that the wife took
care of the home, kept the home free from impurity, and led reform movements outside of the
home).
324 Bradwell v. People of State of Ill., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
325 Id. at 141.
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More recently, the Supreme Court again fell prey to the view that wo-
men must be protected, particularly by the state, in Goesaert v. Cleary.326 In
Goesaert, the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a
Michigan law providing that no woman could obtain a bartender's certificate
unless she was the "'wife or daughter of the male owner' of a licensed liquor
establishment." 327 Mixing paternalistic and federalism concerns, the Su-
preme Court opined that "Michigan evidently believes that the oversight as-
sured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father
minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without such protecting
oversight. This Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief by
the Michigan legislature."328 Other than protecting women from its view of
the vices of bar life, it is unclear what the Michigan legislature thought the
"hazards" might be that justified their exclusion from the bartending profes-
sion. Thus, notions of paternalism infected court decisions in both past and
present times.
The long-standing paternalistic notions of women not only intermingled
with federalism in courthouses to discriminate against women in the past, but
they have also historically affected other legislative efforts regarding wo-
men.329 Far from frowning upon gender-based animus in the form of domes-
tic violence, some states passed laws allowing it under certain circumstances.
For example, an 1824 Mississippi law allowed husbands to inflict "moderate
chastisement in cases of emergency" upon their wives. 330 Although aggra-
vated assault constituted a crime in every state during the nineteenth century,
judges and lawmakers believed wife-beating to be a matter best resolved by
those in the home.33' Judges and lawmakers did not condone wife-beating,
but neither did they see it as a social problem to be resolved by the govern-
ment.332 The foundation for the blind eye turned toward domestic violence
in the past again lay in Victorian thinking. Because "a husband could be held
legally responsible for his wife's actions, he should have the right to control
her actions and punish her when necessary. '33
3
In addition to infecting the area of domestic violence, the outdated Vic-
torian views of women also plagued another violent aspect of gender-based
animus-the law of rape. States have long defined rape to be a criminal of-
fense, but the interests of men "warped" the enforcement of the rape laws as
written.334 Similar to prevailing patterns today, police hesitated before be-
coming involved in "domestic disturbances" in the past and police manuals
instructed police to take no action during a call other than to try to calm the
326 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
327 Id at 465 (quoting MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.990(1) (Cum. Supp. 1947)).
328 Id at 466 (previously stating that Michigan could legislate to reduce moral or social
problems it fears).
329 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 419-20
(1993).
330 RODERICK PHILLIPS, UNTYING THE KNo-r. A SHORT HISTORY OF DIVORCE 99 (1991).
331 FRIEDMAN, supra note 329, at 222.
332 Id. at 223.
333 PHILLIPS, supra note 330, at 98.
334 FRIEDMAN, supra note 329, at 430.
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parties.335 These practices reflect the Victorian notion that the law should
not intrude into the home and harmed women because the home was largely
the domain of women to the Victorian mind. Furthermore, the hands-off
approach to rape and Victorian thinking even influenced the judiciary and its
treatment of sexual assault victims. The law of rape required a woman to
resist and women who gave in had no right to complain.336 Predating the
judge's comment cited at the beginning of the paper, judges expected women
to resist attacks as a sign of innocence because "what woman (said the
judges) would not be so 'revoltingly unwilling' to be raped that she would not
'resist so hard and so long as she was able?' ,337 Juries too frequently placed
the victim's character and dress at issue as they searched for evidence of re-
sistance. 338 Given these disabilities imposed by the unwritten law in both the
present and past, it is no wonder that women hesitate to notify authorities
about instances of gender-based violence-they are seen as both a victim and
cause of the incident.
In light of the history of discrimination against women, the Supreme
Court's rejection of the VAWA reflects many of the same ideals that have
plagued women throughout history. Despite asserting that the VAWA regu-
lates an area of traditional state concern involving the family, history demon-
strates that states have failed to address or redress gender-based violence
because it intrudes into the domestic sphere. However, the reliance on fam-
ily law as an area of state prerogative immune from federal inspection is mis-
placed. Marriage is frequently cited as an area historically regulated by
states, but that did not prevent the Supreme Court from overturning Vir-
ginia's anti-miscegenation statute in Loving v. Virginia.339 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court recently stuck down a Washington family law statute that
allowed any person to seek court-ordered visitation with children.340 Thus,
the Supreme Court does not fail to interfere with state family law when it
feels doing so will promote justice.
VI. Conclusion
In the end, the Morrison decision ties modern-day discrimination to our
nation's discriminatory past. The result in Morrison symbolizes the power
that traditional views of women still have over the nation. Declaring the
VAWA to be unconstitutional continues a "'romantic paternalism' which, in
practical effect, put[s] women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." 341 However,
women are no longer confined to the domestic sphere. Modern society relies
335 Id. at 429 (calling behavior of this kind "tacit approval of the husband's right to beat his
wife").
336 Id. at 216 (characterizing anything less than putting up a real fight as "grudging
consent").
337 Id. at 217 (quoting People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (N.Y. 1847)).
338 Id. at 431 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 250-252
(1966)).
339 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
340 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
341 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (observing that "our nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination").
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on women in the work force, and they constitute an important aspect of the
ever-changing notion of commerce. Overturning the VAWA simply ignores
the contribution of women to the economy and suggests an outdated version
of what constitutes women's work. With its support of the VAWA, however,
public opinion demonstrates that outdated ideas of women are not as preva-
lent in society. But, the public does not have five votes on the Court.
Not only does Morrison represent a link to our nation's history of dis-
crimination, but it also is a bad portent for other anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. For example, Congress has tried (but not yet succeeded) to enact the
Hate Crimes Prevention Act to prevent discrimination against suspect clas-
ses. 34 2 As a basis for the legislation, Congress relied upon its commerce
power by linking hate crimes to interstate commerce via legislative find-
ings.34 3 In short, the legislative history and goals of the federal Hate Crimes
Prevention Act are quite similar to that of the VAWA. By invalidating the
VAWA's civil rights remedy, the Court places the anti-hate crime measure in
a constitutionally tenuous position because the reasoning used to overturn
the civil rights provision applies equally as well to the federal hate crimes act.
As a result, the ability of the federal government to redress discrimination is
weakened and forces groups to rely on state government for remedies. His-
tory demonstrates, however, that state governments use their sovereign rights
as a proxy for state-sponsored discrimination, thereby leaving some without
redress for discriminatory acts.
In addition to throwing out the written law embodied in the VAWA, the
Morrison decision diminishes the symbolic value of the law-a crucial aspect
of the law in general. The relationship between objects and governmental
approval is a powerful symbol in the eyes of the public.344 To see the vital
link between symbolism and governmental approval, one need look no fur-
ther than the controversy surrounding the Confederate flag flying atop the
South Carolina capitol building or the clamor to remove holiday displays
from governmental buildings.34 5 Seeing reminders of our nation's tragic past,
such as the Confederate banner, gives the public the feeling that the govern-
ment or its officials embrace the past and support ideals long rejected by
history. By deeming the VAWA to be unconstitutional, the Court gives its
symbolic imprimatur to gender-based animus. Although the justices cer-
tainly do not support gender-based violence in any way, their decision out
tacks the one body capable of dealing with a national problem-the
Congress.
342 For the latest version, see S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 245 to
punish those convicted of injuring others due to race, color, national origin, religion, gender,
sexual orientation, or disability).
343 See, e.g., John Bacon & Kathy Kiely, S.C. Governor Signs Bill to Lower Battle Banner,
USA TODAY, May 24, 2000, at 3A; Associated Press, S.C. Law to Lower Flag July 1; Governor
Declares Debate is History; NAACP Disagrees, WASH. POST, May 24, 2000, at A2.
344 But see Christopher James Regan, Note, A Whole Lot of Nothing Going On: The Civil
Rights "Remedy" of the Violence Against Women Act, 75 NoTrE DAME L. REv. 797, 811 (calling
the VAWA's civil rights remedy "psychotherapeutic legislation" because it will not achieve its
intended results).
345 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (involving a dispute about a Nativity scene er-
ected by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island).
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Despite all of the alarming similarity with the past experiences of minor-
ity groups, history also demonstrates that the Court's view of the federal pro-
tection against gender-based animus will change in time. As time advances,
our nation has extended the law to protect the minority from the interests of
the majority. After holding, for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court bravely opposed racial discrimination in deci-
sions like Brown v. Board of Education.346 In fact, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 not only ostensibly protected the civil rights of African-Americans, but
also gave women a right to sue employers on the theory of sex discrimination
under Title VII.347 However, the recognition of sex discrimination is a recent
development and only begins the work needed to better the status of women
in society. In his Morrison summation, Justice Rehnquist contended that "no
civilized system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy" for the harm
that resulted from the victim's gender-based attack.34 8 The Morrison deci-
sion discards one potential remedy available to victims of gender-based vio-
lence and funnels them to state justice systems fraught with gender-based
discrimination, thereby reducing a victim's chance to obtain a remedy. We
are not as civilized as we think, but we will change in time.
346 See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
347 Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 816 (1991) (observing that the "fed-
eral cause of action for sexual harassment is an innovation of our times." Moreover, the inclu-
sion of "sex" in The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "something of an accident, at best" and that the
phrase "sexual harassment" was not used until the 1970s).
348 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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